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SHERLOCK HOLMES AND THE PROBLEM OF THE
DEAD HAND: THE MODIFICIATION AND
TERMINATION OF “IRREVOCABLE” TRUSTS
RICHARD C. AUSNESS*
I. INTRODUCTION
I must confess that Sherlock Holmes will not appear in this
Article.1 The use of the eminent detective’s name in the title is
nothing more than an underhanded attempt on my part to induce
potential readers to test the murky waters of American trust law.
However, unlike Mr. Holmes, the “Dead Hand” will appear with some
frequency, principally in the form of long-dead ancestors who hope to
continue exercising control over trust property at the expense of their
living descendants.
In short, this Article is about the modification and termination
of so-called “irrevocable” trusts. A trust may be made irrevocable at
the time of its creation or it may become so at a later time. A
testamentary trust is one that is embodied in a will and becomes
effective at the testator’s death. Since the testator will be dead by the
time the trust becomes effective, he2 will not be in a position to modify
Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Everett Metcalf, Jr., Professor of Law, University
of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968 University of Florida; LL.M. Yale Law
School.
1 This is not to say that the famous sleuth was unfamiliar with trusts and estates matters.
Some of his most celebrated cases involved inheritance and other donative transfers of one
sort or another. See Stephen R. Alton, The Game Is Afoot!: The Significance of Donative
Transfers in the Sherlock Holmes Canon, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 125 (2011).
2 Of course, I realize that settlors, testators, beneficiaries, and trustees are female, as well
as male. However, the constant use of “he, she or it” and similar phrases would make for
very awkward writing. Consequently, and with all due respect to the female half of the
human species, I have adopted the traditional, and possibly outdated, convention of using
“his” or “him” to refer include not only members of the opposite sex, as well as corporate
fiduciaries who, unlike ships, are not affiliated with any particular gender.
*
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or revoke it.3 For the same reason, a revocable trust will become
irrevocable when the settlor dies4 or when the power to revoke is
released. Finally, an inter vivos trust may be irrevocable when it is
first created if the settlor disclaims the right to revoke or modify the
trust.5 Although these types of trusts are irrevocable as far as the
settlor is concerned, they can sometimes be modified or terminated by
others.
This Article will examine the various ways in which
irrevocable trusts can be modified or terminated. It will also consider
the potential conflicts that may arise when beneficiaries desire to
terminate the trust prematurely or change its terms in some
significant way.
Part II analyzes the traditional rules regarding the
modification and termination of irrevocable trusts. In most cases,
judicial approval is required. The discussion of termination focuses
on the Claflin Doctrine, which is widely followed in the United
States.6 According to this doctrine, a court will not authorize
termination if a material purpose of the trust has not been
accomplished.7 This requirement effectively prevents discretionary,
spendthrift, and support trusts from being terminated, as well as
those which postpone vesting or distribution until the beneficiaries
reach a certain age.8 On the other hand, modification of the
administrative provisions of a trust may be permitted under the
equitable deviation doctrine if unforeseen circumstances threaten to
defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of trust purposes.9
3

See Tara M. Niendorf, Save the Wealth! Trust Decanting and Oklahoma, 66 OKLA. L.
REV. 615, 620 (2014); Charles Epps Ipock, A Judicial and Economic Analysis of Attorney’s
Fees in Trust Litigation and the Resulting Inequitable Treatment of Trust Beneficiaries, 43
ST. MARY’S L.J. 855, 863 (2012).
4 See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Spendthrift: The Argument Against Small Trust
Termination, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 163, 175 (2012-13).
5 See Cheryl Swack, The Balanchine Trust: Dancing Through the Steps of Two-Part
Licensing, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 265, 270 (1999); Lauren Z. Curry, Agents in Secrecy:
The Use of Information Surrogates in Trust Administration, 64 VAND. L. REV. 925, 927
(2011); Samuel R. Scarcello, Transfer Taxes in Flux: A Comparison of Alternative Plans for
GRAT Reform, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 321, 323 n.7 (2012).
6 Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). See Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love:
Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 467 (2006)
[hereinafter Conditional Love].
7 See, e.g., Trabits v. First Nat’l Bank of Mobile, 295 Ala. 85, 90, 323 So.2d 353, 357 (1975)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337(2) (1959)); Carnahan v. Johnson, 711
N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (citing In re Trust of Grant, 5th Dist. Stark No. CA6122, (Sept. 26, 1984) (unreported); Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Or. 585, 597, 230 P. 554, 558
(1924); Hurley v. Moody Nat’l Bank of Galveston, 98 S.W.3d 307, 311-12 (Tex. App. 2003);
Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. 1977); Bussell v.
Wright, 133 Wis. 445, 113 N.W. 644, 646-47 (1907).
8 See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1303, 1328 (2002-03).
9 In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust Agreement, 953 N.E.2d 573, 580 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011).

AUSNESS.MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/20/15 3:19 PM

THE MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS

239

In addition, a few courts have extended the equitable deviation
doctrine to permit modification of a trust’s distributive provisions.10
Nevertheless, it is still fairly difficult to modify or terminate a trust
under the traditional regime.
Part III examines various provisions of the Uniform Trust
Code (the “Code”) and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (the
“Restatement”) that loosen some of the traditional restrictions on
trust modification and termination. For example, the Code permits a
court to terminate a trust if, due to unforeseen circumstances,
termination would further the purposes of the trust.11
The
Restatement goes even further, allowing a court to disregard the
material purpose requirement if it determines that the reasons for
termination outweigh the material purpose of the trust.12 The Code
and the Restatement also relax some of the traditional rules on
modification. For example, the Code declares that a court may modify
a trust’s distributive provisions when necessary to further its
purposes.13 In addition, the Code permits a court to modify a trust’s
administrative provisions without regard to changed circumstances if
it concludes that retaining the original trust provisions would be
impracticable, wasteful, or would impair administration of the trust.14
The Restatement also relaxes the equitable deviation doctrine’s
material purpose requirement by allowing a court to modify a trust if
it finds that the benefits of the proposed modification outweigh the
material purposes of the trust.15
Part IV describes how the settlor can authorize modification or
termination of the trust in the trust instrument itself rather than
relying on the courts. One alternative is to give the trustee the power
to terminate or modify the trust.16 Another popular technique is
“decanting,” which involves empowering the trustee to transfer trust
property to another trust.17 Because the second trust may have
different administrative and distributive provisions than the original
trust, decanting is a backhanded method of modifying a trust.18 A
large number of states have now enacted legislation to allow

10

See Petition of Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2013).
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003).
13 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a).
14 Id. § 412(b).
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2).
16 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (2013).
17 See S. Alan Medlin, The South Carolina Probate Code Patched and Refurbished: Version
2013, 6 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L. J. 81, 94 (2013-14).
18 Melissa J. Willms, Decanting Trusts: Irrevocable, Not Unchangeable, 6 EST. PLAN. &
CMTY. PROP. L. J. 35, 37 (2013-14).
11
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decanting.19 Finally, the settlor can appoint a trust protector and vest
him with the power to modify or terminate the trust.20
Finally, Part V discusses the potential conflicts between the
interests of deceased settlors and living beneficiaries, an issue that
often arises when the beneficiaries seek to modify or terminate the
trust. Recently, this problem has become more acute as a growing
number of states have abolished or modified the traditional Rule
Against Perpetuities in a way that permits settlors to create perpetual
or “dynasty” trusts that may endure for many generations.21 In an
attempt to strike a reasonable balance between the rights of the
deceased settlor (the dead hand) and those of the living beneficiaries,
I propose that the first generation of trust beneficiaries (typically the
settlor’s children) continue to be subject to the usual requirements for
modifying or terminating a trust. This would ensure that the settlor’s
intent is respected for at least one generation. However, second- and
subsequent-generation beneficiaries – where permitted by state law –
could modify or terminate the trust without court approval.
AND

II. TRADITIONAL RULES CONCERNING THE TERMINATION
MODIFICATION OF IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS
A. Termination

Under the traditional rules, a trust may be terminated in
various ways.22 For example, if it is expressly limited in duration, it
will terminate at the expiration date.23 In addition, a trust will
terminate when all of the trust purposes have been accomplished.24 A
trust will also terminate by merger if the beneficiary also acquires
legal title to the trust property.25 Moreover, a trust may terminate if

19

See Niendorf, supra note 3, at 622-23.
Thomas E. Simmons, Decanting and Its Alternatives: Remodeling and Revamping
Irrevocable Trusts, 55 S.D. L. REV. 253, 270 (2010).
21 Diana S.C. Zeydel, Developing Law on Changing Irrevocable Trusts: Staying Out of the
Danger Zone, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L .J. 1, 2 (2012).
22 See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Steinitz, 288 Ill. App. 3d 926, 932, 681 N.E.2d 669, 674
(1997); Hamel v. Hamel, 296 Kan. 1060, 1068, 299 P.3d 278, 284 (2013).
23 See La Salle Nat’l Bank v. MacDonald, 2 Ill.2d 581, 587, 119 N.E.2d 266, 269 (Ill. 1954).
24 See Brine v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 745 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1984);
Beach v. Oneida Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Cnt. N.Y., 206 F.Supp. 508, 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1961);
Clement v. Charlotte Hospital Ass’n, Inc., 137 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Matter of Estate of Stephan, 566 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Papale-Keefe v.
Altomare, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 314, 647 N.E.2d 722, 726 (1995); First Am. Nat’l Bank v.
Cole, 211 Tenn. 213, 222, 364 S.W.2d 875, 878 (1963); Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133
(Utah 1977). A trust that is allowed to continue after its intended purposes have been
accomplished is known as a “wasting trust.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,
446-47, 119 S.Ct. 755, 764 (1999); Bennett v. Conrail Matched Savings Plan Admin. Comm.,
168 F.3d 671, 679 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999).
25 See In re Saber, 233 B.R. 547, 553 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999).
20
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the purposes of the trust have become unlawful, contrary to public
policy, or impossible to achieve.26 Furthermore, a trust can be
terminated if the settlor and all of the beneficiaries agree to it.
Finally, a court may terminate a trust with the consent of all of the
beneficiaries, provided that termination will not be contrary to a
material purpose of the trust.27
1. Agreement by the Settlor and Beneficiaries
A court can terminate a trust if the settlor and all of the
beneficiaries (if they are sui juris) request judicial termination, even if
the trustee objects and the trust purposes are not yet fully
accomplished.28 This rule applies even when the trust in question is a
spendthrift trust.29 Of course, this rule will not allow a court to
terminate a trust when unborn or undetermined beneficiaries have
not joined in the petition to terminate.30 This exception is nicely
illustrated in DuPont v. Equitable Security Trust Co.31
In 1929, Hallock DuPont created an irrevocable inter vivos
trust in connection with a pending divorce from his wife, Elizabeth.32
The trust instrument was very complex, but essentially was intended
to provide for Elizabeth and the settlor’s two-year-old daughter, Eve.33
However, Hallock also retained a reversion if Eve died without
surviving issue.34 Elizabeth remarried and died in 1942.35 In 1954,
Hallock and Eve informed the trustee that they were “revoking” the
26

F. Ladson Boyle, When It’s Broke — Fix It: Reforming Irrevocable Trusts to Change Tax
Consequences, 53 TAX LAW. 821, 824 (1999-2000).
27 See In re Estate of Harbaugh, 231 Kan. 564, 569, 646 P.2d 498, 503 (1982); Am. Nat’l
Bank v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1340-41 (Wyo. 1995).
28 See Peck v. Peck, 133 So. 3d 587, 588-589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Preston v. City Nat’l
Bank, 294 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Botzum v. Havana Nat’l Bank, 367 Ill.
539, 542, 12 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1937); Ludlow’s Trustee v. Ludlow, 249 Ky. 396, 398, 60
S.W.2d 965, 966 (1933); Mahan v. Mahan, 320 Md. 262, 276, 577 A.2d 70, 77 (1990); Hein v.
Hein, 214 Mich. App. 356, 359, 543 N.W.2d 19, 20 (1995); In re Zinke’s Trust, 83 N.Y.S.2d
813, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948); O’Brien v. Holden, 104 Vt. 338, 347, 160 A. 192, 196 (1932);
Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308, 318, 75 P.2d 132, 137 (1938); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 338(1) (1959); Boyle, supra note 26, at 823.
29 See Preston v. City Nat’l Bank, 294 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Hein v. Hein,
214 Mich. App. 356, 359, 543 N.W.2d 19, 20 (1995); Musick v. Reynolds, 798 S.W.2d 626,
629 (Tex. App. 1990) (citing Sayers v. Baker, 171 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)).
30 See Levy v. Crocker-Citizens Nat’l Bank, 14 Cal.App.3d 102, 105, 94 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3
(1971); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 261 Iowa 112, 121, 152 N.W.2d 605, 611 (1967); In re Kamerly’s
Estate, 348 Pa. 225, 227, 35 A.2d 258, 259 (1944) (internal citations omitted); In re Bowers’
Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 87, 29 A.2d 519, 520 (1943); In re Lewis’ Estate, 231 Pa. 60, 62, 79
A. 921, 922 (1911).
31 35 Del. Ch. 261, 115 A.2d 482 (1955).
32 Id. at 262, 115 A.2d at 483.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 265, 115 A.2d at 485.
35 Id. at 263, 115 A.2d at 484.
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trust, alleging that they were the only remaining persons with an
interest in the trust property.36 When the trustee refused to return
the trust corpus, Hallock and Eve sought judicial termination of the
trust.37 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the court appointed a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of Eve’s minor children.38
The guardian sided with the trustee, and opposed termination of the
trust.39
At issue was the nature of Eve’s children in the trust. The
trust instrument stated in considerable detail who would get the trust
corpus if: (1) Eve predeceased Elizabeth, leaving lawful issue who
survived Elizabeth, or (2) Eve predeceased Elizabeth, leaving lawful
issue who did not survive Elizabeth.40 What the trust instrument did
not do was specify what would happen if Eve survived Elizabeth and
died, leaving lawful issue.41 This led the court to invoke the “gift by
implication” doctrine,42 concluding that the trust’s overall scheme of
distribution indicated that the settlor wanted to provide for his
grandchildren if Eve outlived Elizabeth.43 Accordingly, the court
ruled that a remainder in favor of Eve’s children was implied in the
trust instrument.44 Since Eve’s children did not join in the plaintiffs’
request to terminate the trust, the court refused to terminate the
trust since essential parties had withheld their consent.45
2. Termination by Beneficiaries without the Settlor’s Consent
In some cases, the beneficiaries of a trust can compel its
termination when the settlor is dead and, thus, unable to consent to
the trust’s termination. In theory, it is not necessary for the
beneficiaries to obtain a court decree if the requirements for trust
termination are met.46 However, the trustee will often force the
parties to seek judicial approval of a proposed termination.47

36

Dupont, at 263, 115 A.2d at 484.
Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 269-270, 115 A.2d at 487.
41 DuPont, at 270, 115 A.2d at 488.
42 For a discussion of this doctrine, see Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done:
Accommodating the Erring and Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 450, 454 n.229 (2001);
Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the
Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 820, 825-26 (2001); John H. Langbein &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change in Direction
in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 530, 538-41 (1981-82).
43 DuPont, 35 Del. Ch. at 274, 115 A.2d at 490.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65, general cmt. a.
47 Id.
37
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a. The English Rule
Since the 1841 decision of Saunders v. Vautier,48 English
courts permit termination of a trust with the consent of all of the
beneficiaries.49 In that case, the testator placed a large amount of
East India Company stock into a testamentary trust and directed the
trustee to distribute it to the settlor’s great nephew, Daniel, when he
reached the age of twenty-five. However, Daniel brought suit to
terminate the trust when he reached the age of majority. Since
Daniel’s interest was indefeasibly vested, the Chancery Court ruled
that he was entitled to demand the trust property when he reached
the age of twenty-one. The court reasoned that a trust should be
indestructible only until the beneficiary became legally competent.50
b. The Claflin Doctrine and the Material Purpose Requirement
The Saunders decision was generally followed in the United
States until the emergence of the Claflin Doctrine in the late
nineteenth century.51 According to the Claflin Doctrine, a trust
cannot be terminated unless all of the beneficiaries consent and early
termination will not defeat a “material purpose” of the trust.52 On the
other hand, the converse of this is also true: the beneficiaries of a
trust may compel the termination if all of the material purposes of the
trust have been achieved.53

48

(1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch.)
See, e.g., In re Couturier, [1907] 1 Ch. 470; In re Jacob’s Will, (1861) 54 Eng. Rep. 683;
Gosling v. Gosling, (1859) 70 Eng. Rep. 426; Rocke v. Rocke, (1845) 50 Eng.Rep. 267. In
addition, the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53 § 1 (a-d) (Eng.) now gives the
English courts considerable discretion to modify or terminate trusts even when some of the
beneficiaries are unknown or unborn. See also Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary
Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1176-77 (20132014); Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 468-469.
50 Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The
Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 704, 709-10
(2000-01).
51 See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215,
227 (2011). However, a few courts have continued to follow Saunders. See Spooner v.
Dunlap, 87 N.H. 384, 180 A. 256 (1935); Newlin v. Girard Trust Co., 116 N.J. Eq. 498, 502,
174 A. 479, 481 (1934).
52 See Steele v. Kelley, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 712, 733, 710 N.E.2d 973, 989 (1999). The party
requesting that the trust be terminated has the burden of showing that termination will not
be contrary to the material purposes of the trust. See In re Estate of Somers, 277 Kan. 761,
769, 89 P.3d 898, 905 (2004); In re Tufford’s Trust, 275 Minn. 66, 71, 145 N.W.2d 59, 63-64
(1966).
53 See In re Estate of Harbaugh, 231 Kan. 564, 568, 646 P.2d 498, 502 (1982); Bennett v.
Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 434 S.W.2d 560, 563, 1968 (Mo. 1968); In re Bassett’s
Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 508, 190 A.2d 415, 417-18 (1963); Estate of Weeks, 485 Pa. 329, 333,
402 A.2d 657, 658-59 (1979); Am. Nat’l. Bank v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1340, 1995 Wyo.
LEXIS 129 at *8 (Wyo. 1995).
49
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This rule originated in Claflin v. Claflin,54 an 1889 decision by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In that case, the
settlor, Wilbur Claflin, placed one-third of the residue of his estate in
trust to pay the proceeds to his son, Adelbert, over a period of time.55
The will directed Wilbur’s trustee to pay Adelbert $10,000 at age
twenty-one, $10,000 at age twenty-five, and the balance when he
reached age thirty.56 Several years after he reached the age of
twenty-one, Adelbert sought to terminate the trust and receive the
remaining trust property.57 Rejecting the English court’s ruling in
Saunders, the Claflin court held that the settlor’s wishes must be
carried out, declaring that “a testator has a right to dispose of his own
property with such restrictions and limitations, not repugnant to law,
as he sees fit, and that his intentions [should] be carried out, unless
they contravene some positive rule of law, or are against public
policy.”58
Following the Claflin Doctrine, most American courts refuse to
terminate a trust if its “material purposes” are not fully
accomplished.59 As one commentator pointed out, “[t]he material
purpose rule reflects a policy judgment that the settlor’s ‘intentions
ought to be carried out.’”60 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts
section 337(2) adopted the material purpose restriction for
terminating trusts, declaring “[i]f the continuance of the trust is
necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the
beneficiaries cannot compel its termination.”61
Hurley v. Moody National Bank of Galveston62 illustrates the
material purpose concept. In her will, Mathilde Hurley bequeathed
$50,000 each to her two children, Paulette Hilton and James Hurley,
and placed the rest of her estate in trust for the benefit of Paulette’s
son, Nathan.63 The trustee was authorized to spend as much of the
trust income as necessary for Nathan’s education.64 Furthermore, the
trust instrument provided that the trust would terminate when
Nathan reached the age of thirty-five or when the trustee determined
54

149 Mass. 19, 20, 20 N.E. 454, 455 (1889).
Id.
56 Id. at 21, 20 N.E. at 455.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456.
59 See, e.g., Trabits, at 90, 323 So. 2d at 357 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
337(2) (1959)); Carnahan, at 1097 (internal citations omitted); Closset, at 597, 230 P. at 558;
Hurley, at 311-12; Frost, at 154; Bussell, at 445, 113 N.W. at 646-47.
60 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 662-63 (2013-14) (quoting Claflin, 149 Mass. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456).
61 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959).
62 98 S.W.3d 307.
63 Id. at 309.
64 Id.
55
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that Nathan had completed his education.65 Upon termination of the
trust, the trust corpus was to be divided between Paulette and
James.66 Nathan was eighteen years old when his grandmother
died.67 Nathan enrolled in college a year later, but eventually
dropped out and told the trustee that he did not want to continue his
education.68 Later, Nathan changed his mind and enrolled in a
community college in California.69 Nathan testified that at the time
he talked to the trustee, “he was using drugs heavily and was starting
to get into cocaine and that his life was very difficult.”70
Meanwhile, James Hurley requested that the trustee
terminate the trust, arguing that Nathan had completed his
education.71
The trustee filed a petition seeking a judicial
determination of whether the trust had terminated, or whether
Nathan was entitled to income from the trust while he continued his
education in California.72 The trustee responded that Mathilde, by
authorizing support for Nathan until he reached the age of thirty-five,
did not expect him to be enrolled continuously in college, but realized
that he might take time off from his schooling.73 Consequently, the
period that Nathan dropped out of college was merely a break in his
education and not a completion of his education.74
The trial court concluded that the trust had not terminated,
which was affirmed on appeal.75 The appeals court observed that the
purpose of the trust was to enable Nathan to obtain a college
education.76 Furthermore, the court agreed with the trustee that
Nathan was not required to attend college continuously.77 The court
observed that the settlor had given the trustee broad discretion to
carry out the purposes of the trust.78 Accordingly, it agreed with the
trustee that a material purpose of the trust, namely providing support
for Nathan’s education, was not yet achieved.79
In particular, American courts have relied on the reasoning of
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Hurley, 98 S.W.3d at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Hurley, 98 S.W.3d at 311.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 310, 312.
Hurley, 98 S.W.3d at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 311.
Id.
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the Claflin decision in refusing to terminate trusts which: (1) contain
a spendthrift provision, (2) specify the age or other event at which the
beneficiary is to receive his or her disbursement, (3) vest the trustee
with discretion over such disbursements, or (4) provide support for the
beneficiary.80
c. Spendthrift Trusts
A trust which contains a provision that prevents a beneficiary
from transferring his interest in the trust is commonly known as a
spendthrift trust.81 Although spendthrift trusts are not recognized in
England, they are valid in most American jurisdictions.82 The
spendthrift provision is an effective device to protect a beneficiary’s
interest in the trust from attachment by creditors.83 Therefore, it is
not surprising that most courts have determined that the existence of
a spendthrift provision in a trust will prevent a trust (along with the
protection the spendthrift provision provides) from being terminated
while the beneficiary is still alive.84
An interesting example of this rule is Cotham v. First National
Bank of Hot Springs.85 The case involved a testamentary trust, which
provided income of $300 per month to the settlor’s son, and after the
son’s death, $100 per month to each of the settlor’s grandchildren.86
The trust also contained a spendthrift provision.87 After the settlor’s
death, his son and one of the grandchildren filed suit against the
trustee, arguing that the trust violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities.88 After the lower court upheld the validity of the trust,
the other two grandchildren, together with the original plaintiffs,

80

See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1328.
See Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849 F. Supp. 382, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1994) aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 50 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Trust D Created Under Last Will & Testament of
Darby, 290 Kan. 785, 792, 234 P.3d 793, 800 (2010).
82 See Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial
Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 150 (2007).
83 See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2 (1995).
84 See Cotham at 172-173, 697 S.W.2d at 104; Sawyer at 122, 162 N.W.2d at 611;
Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Crist, 140 Iowa 308, 118 N.W. 394, 395 (1908); Darby, at 793, 234
P.3d at 800; Somers, at 767-69, 89 P.3d at 903-05; Univ. of Maine Found. v. Fleet Bank of
Maine, 2003 Me. 20, 817 A.2d 871, 875 (2003); Mahan, at 276, 577 A.2d at 77; Rose v. So.
Michigan Nat’l Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 282, 238 N.W. 284, 287 (1931); Heritage Bank-North,
N.A. v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 164 N.J. Super. 33, 36, 395 A.2d 552, 554 (1978); In re
Africa’s Estate, 359 Pa. 567, 570, 59 A.2d 925, 926 (1948); Germann v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
286 S.C. 34, 37, 331 S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 337, general cmt. l.
85 697 S.W.2d 101.
86 Id. at 102.
87 Id. at 103.
88 Id. at 102.
81

AUSNESS.MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/20/15 3:19 PM

THE MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS

247

requested that the trust be terminated by the court.89 The trust
beneficiaries appealed when the lower court refused to terminate the
trust.90
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court first affirmed that
the trust did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.91 It then
determined that the trust was a spendthrift trust.92 According to the
court, by withholding the power of alienation, the settlor intended to
restrict the trust corpus so that the beneficiaries could not obtain
access to it except at fixed intervals and in fixed amounts.93 Finally,
the court concluded, “[s]ince the continuance of the spendthrift trust
is necessary to carry out the testator’s purpose, the beneficiaries
cannot compel its termination.”94
d. Postponed Enjoyment of the Trust Corpus
A number of cases have involved attempts by beneficiaries to
terminate a trust notwithstanding the fact that the trust instrument
has postponed full enjoyment of the trust corpus. In most cases,
courts have refused to terminate these trusts even at the request of a
sole beneficiary. The court’s opinion in Speth v. Speth95 offers a
comprehensive examination of this issue. In Speth, the decedent
placed her residuary estate in a testamentary trust, and directed the
trustee to distribute the income from the trust to her brother, James
Speth, for ten years.96 At the end of that period, James was to receive
the entire trust corpus.97 James requested that the court terminate
the trust prior to the expiration of the ten-year period because he was
the sole beneficiary.98
The court considered several of the
beneficiary’s arguments in favor of terminating the trust.99 The court
conceded that postponing a sole beneficiary’s enjoyment of a vested
interest for an unreasonable period of time might be contrary to
public policy, but delaying the beneficiary’s access to the trust corpus
for a short period of time, such as ten years, did not seem contrary to
any public interest.100 The court observed that beneficiaries could
freely alienate their interests if they chose to do so.101 Furthermore, a
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Cotham, 697 S.W.2d at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id.
8 N.J. Super. 587, 74 A.2d 344 (1950).
Id. at 587, 74 A.2d at 345.
Id.
Id. at 587, 74 A.2d at 346.
Id. at 593, 74 A.2d at 348.
Speth, at 594, 74 A.2d at 348.
Id.
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settlor might have a good reason for delaying enjoyment until the
beneficiary reached a certain age. According to the court:
It is equally difficult to perceive the considerations of policy
which are said to prevent a testator from exercising his judgment and
discretion by reasonably deferring the unqualified enjoyment of the
principal of his devise or bequest without explaining to the beneficiary
and to the public his reasons for doing so.102
The court added that some seemingly arbitrary or
unreasonable restrictions on the enjoyment of the trust corpus might,
in fact, “rest upon wise and perspicacious reasons known to the
testator and unknown to the general public and to the court.”103
The court then addressed the beneficiary’s claim that the trust
was passive because the trustee had no duty to hold or manage the
trust assets.104 In the latter instance, the trust would be executed by
the Statute of Uses, and legal title to the trust corpus would be
transferred to the beneficiary free of trust. However, in this case, the
court pointed out that the settlor had directed the trustees “to invest
and reinvest the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real,
personal and of every kind and description and wheresoever situated,
and to collect and receive the income thereon” for a period of ten
years.105 In the court’s view, charging the trustees with these
responsibilities ensured that the trust was active.106
Maley v. Citizens National Bank of Evansville107 involved an
attempt by several beneficiaries to terminate a trust, which postponed
full enjoyment of the trust corpus until they reached the age of thirtyone.108 The trust was created in 1927 by Henry Maley from his share
of a testamentary trust established by his mother, Eva, at her death
in 1923.109 It was later supplemented by additional funds that Henry
received from his mother’s trust when he reached the age of thirtyone.110 The trust corpus consisted of Liberty Loan bonds issued by the
United States Government.111 The trust provided that Henry’s wife,
Virginia, would receive the income from the trust during her
lifetime.112 In addition, the trust provided that after Virginia’s death,
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id.
Id. at 595, 74 A.2d at 348.
Id. at 595, 74 A.2d at 349.
Speth, at 589, 74 A.2d at 345.
Id. at 596, 74 A.2d at 349.
120 Ind. App. 642, 92 N.E.2d 727 (1950).
Id. at 650, 92 N.E.2d at 731.
Id. at 646, 92 N.E.2d at 729.
Id. at 649, 92 N.E.2d at 730.
Id. at 646, 92 N.E.2d at 729.
Maley, 120 Ind. App. at 647, 92 N.E.2d at 729.
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the trust corpus would be distributed to Henry and Virginia’s children
when the youngest child reached the age of twenty-six.113 Henry and
Virginia were divorced in 1932, and Henry died in 1935, survived by
his ex-wife and two children, Henry and Virginia.114
Some years later, Virginia and the children brought suit to
terminate the trust, although they had not yet reached the age of
twenty-six.115 The trustee objected, and the trial court refused to
grant the requested relief.116 Relying on the Claflin decision, the
Indiana Appeals Court rejected the contention that the beneficiaries,
as sui juris, were entitled to demand termination of the trust even
though they had not reached the required age for distribution of the
corpus.117 The court declared that Indiana courts had refused to
terminate trusts except in cases “where the interference of the court
did not disturb or destroy the trust scheme, but was rendered
necessary in order to prevent its entire failure.”118
The plaintiffs also claimed that the trust purpose had become
impossible to carry out because the trustee could not obtain an
adequate income from investing in government bonds.119 However,
the court responded that the trustee was not restricted to investing in
such low-interest securities, but was free to shift some of the trust’s
assets to higher-yielding investments.120 For these reasons, the
appeals court upheld the lower court’s refusal to terminate the
trust.121
In Lafferty v. Sheets,122 J.W. and Medora Sheets executed a
joint will which provided that their son, Joseph, would receive the
income from their residuary estate during the lifetime of Joseph’s
wife, Lala.123 If Joseph survived her, he would receive the entire trust
corpus at Lala’s death.124 It was not clear why Joseph’s parents put
this strange provision in their will. In any event, Joseph’s father died

113

Id. at 652-653, 92 N.E.2d at 732.
Id. at 645, 92 N.E.2d at 729.
115 Id. at 650, 92 N.E.2d at 731.
116 Id. at 644, 92 N.E.2d at 728. In the alternative, the plaintiffs requested the court to
modify the trust to enable the trustee to make higher-yielding investments; that request
was also denied. Maley, 120 Ind. App. At 644, 92 N.E.2d at 728.
117 Id. at 654, 92 N.E.2d at 732.
118 Id. at 654, 92 N.E.2d at 733 (quoting Wilson, Trustee, v. Edmonds, 78 Ind. App. 501,
136 N.E. 48, 49 (1922)).
119 Id. at 655, 92 N.E.2d at 733.
120 Id.
121 Maley, 120 Ind. App. at 656, 92 N.E.2d at 734.
122 175 Kan. 741, 267 P.2d 962 (1954).
123 Id. at 742, 267 P.2d at 964.
124 Id.
114
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in September 1950, and his mother died a few months later.125
During probate of his mother’s estate, Joseph, along with Lala and his
two children, sought to have his mother’s residuary estate distributed
directly to Joseph.126 The trial court agreed to distribute the estate to
Joseph, and the executor appealed.127
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the
trust established by the parents’ will was not passive in nature since
the trustee was to actively manage the trust property.128 The court
also declared that it would follow the Claflin Doctrine.129 It also
quoted section 337 and comment j of the Second Restatement of
Trusts, which expressly stated that a court would not ordinarily
terminate a trust prematurely when it provided that the sole
beneficiary of the trust was not to receive the trust corpus until some
later time.130 The court concluded that Joseph’s parents had made it
clear that “the trust created by them was to continue until the death
of the son’s wife [and] that such provision was material to the manner
in which they disposed of their property.”131 Therefore, it reversed the
decision of the trial court.132
e. Discretionary Trusts
“A discretionary trust is established when the grantor gives
the trustee discretion to make distributions from the trust, and the
beneficiary has no legal authority to force the trustee to make a
distribution . . . from either the income or principal.”133 In such cases,
the trust beneficiaries cannot compel the trustee to terminate the
trust prematurely.134 A New Jersey court followed this rule recently
in the case of In re Estate of Bonardi.135 In that case, the testator’s
will created two trusts: the first trust designated the testator’s wife,
Donna, as the income beneficiary, with a gift over to his daughters,

125

Id. at 743, 267 P.2d at 964.
Id. at 743-44, 267 P.2d at 964-65.
127 Lafferty, 175 Kan. at 744, 267 P.2d at 965.
128 Id. at 747, 267 P.2d at 967.
129 Id. at 748, 267 P.2d at 967.
130 Id. at 750, 267 P.2d at 969.
131 Id. at 751, 267 P.2d at 969.
132 Lafferty, 175 Kan. at 751, 267 P.2d at 969.
133 Hemphill v. Shore, 295 Kan. 1110, 1118, 289 P.3d 1173, 1180 (2012). See Solis v.
Koresko, 884 F. Supp. 2d 261, 289 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248,
265, 3 A.3d 1229, 1239 (2010).
134 See, e.g., Clemenson v. Rebsamen, 168 S.W.2d 195, 196-97 (Ark. 1943); In re Roberts’
Estate, 35 N.W.2d 756, 757-58 (Iowa 1949); Hemphill, at 1118, 289 P.3d at 1180; Tannen,
416 N.J. Super. at 265, 3 A.3d at 1239 (2010); In re Estate of Bonardi, 376 N.J. Super. 508,
871 A.2d 103 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337, general cmt. n.
135 376 N.J. Super. 508, 871 A.2d 103.
126
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Danielle and Jessica.136 The testator also authorized the trustee, a
friend of the family, to distribute to Donna “such amounts of the
principal of the Trust as the Trustee, in the exercise of the Trustee’s
absolute discretion, deems advisable for her welfare.”137 The second
trust provided for the distribution of the corpus to Danielle and
Jessica when they reached the age of twenty-five.138
Shortly after the testator’s death, Donna obtained a release of
the daughters’ remainder interest in the first trust and petitioned the
chancery court to terminate it.139 The lower court agreed to the
termination and the trustee appealed.140
The appeals court
reversed.141 The court observed that the testator declared in his will
that the trustee should not invade the trust corpus in order to provide
primary support for Donna since she was capable of supporting
herself.142 Instead, he directed the trustee to “preserve the corpus, to
the extent possible, for ultimate distribution to my children.”143 In
addition, the court noted that the trustee had testified that Donna
was qualified to work full-time as a nurse.144 Furthermore, the
trustee claimed that the testator was concerned about his wife’s
excessive use of alcohol, and expressed concern “that if the estate’s
assets were left to Donna outright, she would continue to lead this
lifestyle which he felt was inappropriate, unhealthy and against his
wishes.”145
These trust provisions suggested that the testator’s intent was
to provide supplementary income to Donna, but vested considerable
discretion in the trustee to manage the trust’s assets prudently and to
only invade the corpus for Donna’s benefit in the case of an
emergency, with the expectation that Danielle and Jessica would
receive most or all of the trust corpus at his wife’s death.146 Allowing
Donna to receive the entire trust corpus would ignore the testator’s
concern about her ability to manage the property responsibly, and
would also frustrate his objective of providing for his daughters or
their descendants after his wife’s death.147 Finally,
since
the
daughters’ remainder interest in the trust would not vest until they
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 511, 871 A.2d at 104.
Id. at 511, 871 A.2d at 105.
Id. at 511, 871 A.2d at 104-105.
Id. at 514, 871 A.2d at 106.
Bonardi, 376 N.J. Super. at 514, 871 A.2d at 106-107.
Id.
Id. at 517, 871 A.2d at 108.
Id.
Id. at 512, 871 A.2d at 105.
Bonardi, 376 N.J. Super. 512, 871 A.2d at 105.
Id. at 517-518, 871 A.2d at 108-109.
Id. at 518, 871 A.2d at 109.
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reached the age of twenty-five, the release of their remainder was
invalid since they had not yet reached twenty-five at the time they
purported to do so.148 Consequently, the court reversed the lower
court’s decision to terminate the trust.149
f. Support Trusts
A number of courts have also refused to terminate support
trusts prematurely.150 A pure support trust is one where the terms of
the trust direct the trustee to pay to the beneficiary or to apply for his
use so much of the income or principal as he believes is necessary for
his support.151 In contrast, a discretionary support trust is one in
which the trustee is authorized to pay the beneficiary whatever
amount of trust income or principal that he believes is necessary for
the beneficiary’s support.152 When the settlor’s intent is to provide
the beneficiary with maintenance and support for life, or for some
fixed period, premature termination of a support trust would seem to
be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. However,
because most support trusts also contain spendthrift clauses, courts
tend to rely on the spendthrift clauses instead of support provisions in
order to justify a refusal to terminate a support trust.
However, the case of Gershaw v. Gershfield153 is an interesting
exception. The Gershaw case involved a trust established by Samuel
Gershfield.154 The trust instrument initially provided that its assets
would be divided at Samuel’s death between his daughter, Cynthia,
and his son, Burton.155 Cynthia was to receive her share free of trust,
but Burton’s share was to remain subject to the trust for his

148

Id. at 518, 871 A.2d at 109.
Id. at 520, 871 A.2d at 110.
150 See, e.g., Gershaw v. Gershfield, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 90, 751 N.E.2d 424, 432 (2001);
West v. Third Nat’l Bank of Hampton Cnty., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 580-81, 417 N.E.2d 991,
993 (1981); In re Henderson’s Estate, 258 Pa. 510, 515, 102 A. 217, 218 (1917); Townsend v.
Rainier Nat’l Bank, 51 Wash. App 19, 22, 751 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1988); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337, general cmt. m.
151 See In re McLoughlin, 507 F.2d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 1975); Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849
F.Supp. 382, 391 (E.D. Pa. 1994) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 50 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 1995); In re
Estate of Gist, 763 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 2009); Emmet Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Ridout,
692 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Iowa 2005); Darby, 290 Kan. at 791, 234 P.3d at 799; In re Estate of
Brown, 148 Vt. 94, 96, 528 A.2d 752, 754 (1987); see also George Gleason Bogert et al., THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 229, 583-84 (3d ed. 2007).
152 See In re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2004); Smith v. Smith, 246 Neb. 193,
197, 517 N.W.2d 394, 398 (1994); Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1988);
Lineback v. Stout, 79 N.C. App. 292, 296, 339 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1976). See also Lawrence A.
Frolik, Discretionary Trusts for a Disabled Beneficiary: A Solution or a Trap for the
Unwary? 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 335, 342 (1984-85).
153 52 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 751 N.E.2d 424.
154 Id. at 82, 751 N.E.2d at 427.
155 Id. at 82-83, 751 N.E.2d at 427.
149
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lifetime.156 The trust was later amended to provide that Burton’s
children, Ace and Julie, might also receive distributions for their
education and support from Burton’s share of the trust until they
reached the age of twenty-five.157
The trust instrument declared that “the Trustees shall pay or
apply so much of the principal and income as the Trustees in their
sole discretion deem advisable to provide for BURTON C.
GERSHFIELD’S proper care, maintenance, medical needs, health,
support, education and emergency needs and that of his issue under
the age of twenty-five.”158 Burton’s share was also subject to a
spendthrift provision.159 Samuel treated his children differently
because Burton’s life was characterized by mental instability,
dysfunctional relationships, and drug abuse.160
Consequently,
Samuel felt that he should keep Burton’s share in trust in order to
provide him with lifetime support and housing.161
After Samuel’s death, Scott Gershaw, the trustee, sought
instructions with respect to the priority of distributions among the
three beneficiaries of Burton’s trust.162 However, at trial, the trustee
asked the court’s permission to terminate the trust and divide its
assets equally among Burton, Ace, and Julie.163 After ordering the
distribution of some of the trust property for the payment of certain
claims and expenses, the court ruled that the one-third of the
remaining assets should be set aside for Burton’s housing needs, and
the rest divided equally between Burton’s children to pay for their
college education.164
The appeals court vacated the trial court’s judgment and
concluded that the primary purpose of the trust was to provide for
Burton’s “lifetime support and housing needs,” and this should take
priority over any distributions to Burton’s children.165 The court also
held that termination was improper because the trust, by its own
terms, was to continue for Burton’s lifetime.166 The court concluded
by declaring “[t]he trustees had a duty to fulfill the donor’s clearly
expressed intention that Burton receive lifetime support and housing,

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 83, 751 N.E.2d at 427.
Id.
Gershaw, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 88, 751 N.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 86, 751 N.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 90, 751 N.E.2d at 432, n.14.
Id.
Id. at 84, 751 N.E.2d at 428.
Gershaw, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 84, 751 N.E.2d at 428.
Id. at 84-85, 751 N.E.2d at 428-29
Id. at 87, 751 N.E.2d at 430.
Id.,at 89-90, 751 N.E.2d at 432.
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if needed, and could not terminate the trust until its purposes had
been fulfilled.”167
3. Partial Termination
Sometimes a court will allow a partial termination of a trust,
particularly when the trust corpus is capable of producing far more
income than is necessary to pay the income beneficiaries. For
example, In the Matter of the Trust Established Under Trust
Agreement of Thomas A. Boright, deceased168 involved a trust with a
corpus of $900,000 and a single beneficiary who was entitled to
receive $12,000 a year for life.169 At the request of the remaindermen,
the Minnesota Supreme Court authorized the trustee to set aside
enough of the trust corpus to make the required payments to the life
beneficiary, or to purchase an annuity to fund these payments.170 The
court also authorized the trustee to distribute the remaining trust
corpus to the remaindermen.171
Another court also allowed partial termination in University of
Maine Foundation v. Fleet Bank of Maine.172 The trust, known as the
Gilbert Trust, was established by the will of Charles Gilbert, who died
in 1953.173 The trust provided for the payment of specific amounts of
money annually to various family members and nonprofit
organizations.174 In addition, the trust provided for termination at
the death of the last life beneficiary, and transfer of the trust corpus
to the University of Maine Foundation and made part of the Charles
E. Gilbert Fund.175 The Fund, which provided loans to students in
medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine, was established by
Gilbert in his will when he exercised a power of appointment created
by his wife.176
Over the years, the trust corpus grew from $3.13 million in
1990, to $9.34 million in 2000.177 This led the Foundation to offer the
three remaining life beneficiaries $25,000 annually to agree to
terminate the trust instead of the $5,000 that they were then
receiving.178
When the trustee refused to terminate the trust
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. at 90, 751 N.E.2d at 432.
377 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1985).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
817 A.2d 871.
Id. at 873.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Univ. of Maine, 817 A.2d at 874.
Id.
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voluntarily, the Foundation sought judicial termination of the trust.179
The lower court agreed, and ordered distribution of most of the trust
corpus to the Foundation.180
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine observed that
the life beneficiaries’ interests were subject to a spendthrift clause.181
Therefore, the court concluded that it would be improper to terminate
the trust since a material purpose of the trust – the protection of the
beneficiaries from the claims of creditors – could not be achieved if the
trust was prematurely terminated.182 However, the court went on to
consider whether partial termination was a viable option.183 Noting
that other courts allow partial termination of a trust in similar
circumstances,184 the Maine court declared that partial termination
“carried out the respective settlor’s intent, while at the same time
released idle funds to the remainderman that the settlor ultimately
intended to benefit.”185 Applying this reasoning to the instant case,
the court concluded that “[n]o good reason exists for the foundation to
wait for the life-beneficiaries’ interests to end before receiving surplus
trust assets,” as long as the court withheld a sufficient amount from
the Foundation’s distribution to enable the trustee to protect the life
beneficiaries’ interests.186
4. Family Settlement Agreements
Family settlement agreements are another means of
terminating a trust.187 A family settlement agreement is a plan
formulated by interested parties to modify or terminate a trust and
distribute the decedent’s property with court approval in a different
manner than that provided for under a will or trust.188 Courts usually
encourage such settlements because they are thought to prevent
hostility and discord among family members.189
When the
beneficiaries of a trust petition the court to terminate the trust

179

Id.
Id.
181 Id. at 873
182 Univ. of Maine, 817 A.2d at 875.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 875-76 (citing Ames v. Hall, 313 Mass. 33, 46 N.E.2d 403, 404 (1943); Boright,
377 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1985)).
185 Univ. of Maine, 817 A.2d at 876.
186 Id.
187 See generally, Gerry W. Beyer, Annual Rev. of Texas Law: Wills and Trusts, 59 SMU L.
REV. 1603, 1614-1615 (2006).
188 In re Estate of Neiswender, 616 N.W.2d 83, 86 (S.D. 2000).
189 See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 236 Ark. 676, 685, 370 S.W.2d 121, 127 (1963); In re Will of
Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 744, 112 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1960); In re Estate of Way, 379 Pa.
421, 437, 109 A.2d 164, 172 (1954). Although these arrangements are usually referred to as
family settlements, they are not limited to family members.
180
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prematurely, they must show that they are competent to execute the
agreement, and that all members of the beneficiary class are
included.190
The beneficiaries must also demonstrate that the
agreement is reasonable and fair to all parties.191 In addition, the
court must conclude that the agreement is designed to resolve a bona
fide controversy involving the will or trust.192 Finally, under the
traditional rule, the beneficiaries must also prove that the trust
purposes have been achieved.193
Although courts have long approved family settlements on the
basis of their inherent powers,194 many states have now enacted
statutes that expressly authorize court approval of settlement
agreements.195 In addition, both the Uniform Probate Code196 and the
Uniform Trust Code197 recognize family settlement agreements. Both
of these uniform acts provide for nonjudicial family settlements.198 It
is interesting to note that neither act specifically requires that the
proposed settlement arise from a dispute or controversy among the
beneficiaries.199
B. Modification of Irrevocable Trusts
The Claflin doctrine has commonly been applied to
modification, as well as termination, of trusts.200 Consequently, a
number of courts have refused to modify the terms of a trust,

190

See Bogert et al., supra note 151, at § 1009, 458-61.
See Merkel v. Long, 368 Mich. 1, 14-15, 117 N.W.2d 130, 136-37 (1962); Metzner v.
Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 336, 194 N.W. 1008, 1012 (1923); Burtman v. Burtman, 94 N.H.
412, 416, 54 A.2d 367, 370 (1947).
192 See Breault v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39, 44 (7th Cir. 1966); In re Estate of Ward, 200
Ariz. 113, 117-18, 23 P.3d 108, 112-13 (App. Div. 1 2001); Altemeier v. Harris, 403 Ill. 345,
350, 86 N.E.2d 229, 233 (1949) (quoting Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334, 340
(1927)); Stein v. La Salle Nat’l Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3, 7, 65 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1946); O’Neil v.
O’Neil, 271 N.C. 106, 112-13, 155 S.E.2d 495, 500-01 (1967).
193 See Adams v. Link, 145 Conn. 634, 638, 145 A.2d 753, 755 (1958); West v. Downer, 218
Ga. 235, 243, 127 S.E.2d 359, 364-65 (1962); Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 396, 113 N.E.
691, 694 (1916); In re Matter of Ransom, 180 N.J. Super. 108, 120, 433 A.2d 834, 840 (Ch.
Div. 1981) (internal citation omitted); Appeal of Gannon, 428 Pa. Super. 349, 367-68, 631
A.2d 176, 185 (1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337, cmt. a).
194 See Bogert et al., supra note 151, at § 1009, 450-51.
195 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.26.344 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-25 (West 2014);
IND. CODE §§ 29-1-0-1 to 29-1-9-3 (2014); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.114 & 633.115 (West
2014); MO. ANN STAT. § 473.084 (West 2014); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1502G (McKinney
2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.24 (West 2014); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3323 (West
2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-7 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 879.59 (West 2013).
196 UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-912, 3-1101, & 3-1102 (2010).
197 UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 111, 411 (2013).
198 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-912 (2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111 (2013).
199 Id.
200 See Conditional Love, supra note 6, at 468; Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the
Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 607 (2005) [hereinafter Perpetual Trusts].
191
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concluding that modification would be contrary to a material purpose
of the settlor or that a material purpose of the trust had not been
attained.201 On the other hand, under the equitable deviation
doctrine, “if circumstances unanticipated by the settlor occur, the
court may modify the administrative terms of the trust, but only to
prevent the unanticipated circumstances from defeating or
substantially impairing the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust.”202 This doctrine has been endorsed by many courts as a means
of enabling them to modify the administrative provisions of a trust in
response to unforeseen circumstances.203
1. Equitable Deviation
Courts have sometimes relied on the equitable deviation
doctrine to override restrictions on the sale of trust property.204 One
of the leading cases on this doctrine is In re Estate of Pulitzer.205
Newspaper publisher, Joseph Pulitzer, died in 1911.206 In his will, he
left shares of the Press Publishing Co. and Pulitzer Publishing in
trust for the benefit of his children and certain other persons.207 The
former company published the New York World, the Sunday World,
and the Evening World, while the latter company published the St.
Louis Post Dispatch.208 In his will, Pulitzer expressly prohibited the
trustees from selling any of the trust’s Press Publishing Co. stock.209
Nevertheless, in 1931, the trustees, with the consent of the trust
beneficiaries, sought court approval to sell the stock.210 The court
201

See, e.g., Smith v. Hallum, 286 Ga. 834, 836, 691 S.E.2d 848, 850 (2010); Thomson v.
Union Nat’l Bank in Kansas City, 291 S.W.2d 178, 182-83 (Mo. 1956).
202 Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose
Property Is It, Anyway? 38 AKRON L. REV. 661, 663 (2005). See also Chapman, at 953,
N.E.2d at 580.
203 See Thurlow v. Berry, 249 Ala. 597, 605, 32 So.2d 526, 533 (1947) (internal citations
omitted); Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal. 2d 352, 359, 101 P.2d 484, 488 (1940); Young v. Young, 255
Mich. 173, 179-80, 237 N.W. 535, 537 (1931); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 19 Misc.3d
337, 340, 852 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (Sur. Ct. 2008); In re Aberlin, 264 A.D.2d 775, 695 N.Y.S.2d
383 (1999); Carnahan, at 1097 (internal citations omitted); Nieman v. Vaughn Cmty.
Church, 154 Wash. 2d 365, 378, 113 P.3d 463, 470-71 (2005) (distinguishing, in the case of a
charitable trust, between equitable deviation and cy pres); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 167.
204 See Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 138 A. 795, 802-03 (1927); Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky.
504, 233 S.W. 1057, 1059-60 (1921); Young, at 179-80, 237 N.W. at 537; In re Estate of
Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931); Carnahan v. Johnson, 711 N.E. 1093,
1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted); Weld v. Weld, 23 R.I. 311, 50 A. 490
(1901); Colin McK. Grant Home v. Medlock, 292 S.C. 466, 474, 349 S.E.2d 655, 660 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1986); Nieman, at 377, 113 P.3d at 468.
205 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87.
206 Id. at 577, 249 N.Y.S. at 91.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 578, 249 N.Y.S. at 92.
209 Id.
210 Pulitzer, at 576, 249 N.Y.S. at 90.
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found that the newspapers owned by Press Publishing had been losing
money for several years,211 and it was likely that the stock would
eventually lose much of its value, thereby diminishing the interests of
the trust beneficiaries.212
The New York Surrogate Court began by observing that
“[c]ourts of equity in other jurisdictions have found power to relieve
against the provisions of the instrument by granting the authority to
dispose of perishable property or wasting assets, despite the express
command or wishes contained in the will.”213 The court then declared
that the “extreme circumstances” in the Pulitzer case justified
disregarding the direction of the testator and authorizing the trustees
to sell the Press Publishing Co. stock.214
As Professor Gallanis points out, the court purported to give
effect to the settlor’s implicit, but unexpressed intention by finding
that Pulitzer’s dominant purpose was to provide for a generous
income for his children and the eventual distribution of the intact
trust corpus to his grandchildren.215 According to the court, “[a] man
of his sagacity and business ability could not have intended that from
mere vanity, the publication of the newspapers, with which his name
and efforts had been associated, should be persisted in until the entire
trust asset was destroyed or wrecked by bankruptcy or dissolution.”216
Notwithstanding the court’s flattering assessment of the testator’s
business acumen, Gallanis concluded that Pulitzer was sufficiently
vain that he probably never thought that his newspapers would
become unprofitable.217 Thus, the court’s reliance on imputed intent
in the Pulitzer case was suspect to say the least.218
In addition to authorizing the sale of trust property, courts
have applied the principle of equitable deviation to such
administrative matters as removing a trustee, modifying a trust
investment portfolio, or extending the duration of the trust. Donnelly
v. National Bank of Washington219 provides an interesting example of
a court’s use of equitable deviation to extend the duration of a trust.
Before his death in 1940, the settlor executed a testamentary trust
providing for his grandson, Willis Donnelly, to receive money for his
support “so long as [he] is a student in good standing at some
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Id. at 582, 249 N.Y.S. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 581, 249 N.Y.S. at 95.
Id. at 582, 249 N.Y.S. at 96-97.
See Gallanis, supra note 51, at 225.
Pulitzer, at 580, 249 N.Y.S. at 95.
See Gallanis, supra note 51, at 225.
Id.
27 Wash.2d 622, 179 P.2d 333 (1947).
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recognized, degree granting college, University, or post-graduate
school, but in no event beyond December 31, 1945.”220
Willis
graduated from the University of Washington in August 1942, and
had completed one year of law school when he was drafted into the
Marine Corps.221 He was discharged in April 1946, and resumed his
law school studies.222 However, the trustee refused to renew his
stipend, declaring that it was not authorized to provide support for
Willis after 1945.223
Willis sued the trustee, and the trial court ordered the trustee
to make payments to Willis for another three years to allow him to
obtain his law degree.224 Relying on the Restatement of Trusts225 and
other sources,226 the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s
decision.227 The court declared that it should do what it believes the
settlor would have done if he could have foreseen what happened.228
According to the court, the settlor had intended to provide enough
financial support to enable his grandson to complete his studies.229 If
World War II had not broken out, the time limit specified in the will
would have provided ample time for Willis to obtain his law degree.230
Obviously, the settlor did not foresee that his grandson would be
called away from his studies for more than three years to serve in the
military during the war.231 According to the court, “[i]t is unthinkable
that a settlor who regarded his grandson as a son would have so
restricted the time on the education payments as to prevent the boy,
because he was summoned from his school to the armed forces of our
country, from completing his education.”232 Therefore, the appeals
court upheld the lower court’s modification of the trust provisions.233
The traditional doctrine of equitable deviation only allowed
modification of the administrative provisions of a trust, and was not
applicable to distributive provisions.234 However, a few courts have
220

Id. at 623, 179 P.2d at 333.
Id.
222 Id. at 624, 179 P.2d at 333.
223 Id.
224 Donnelly, at 624, 179 P.2d at 334.
225 RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 167 (1935).
226 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 167 at 1268-82; Cook, at 362-63, 101 P.2d at 489; Young, at 173,
237 N.W. at 535; Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S.W. 840 (1913).
227 Donnelly, at 629, 179 P.2d at 336.
228 Id. at 627, 179 P.2d at 335.
229 Id. at 627-28, 179 P.2d at 335-36.
230 Id. at 628, 179 P.2d at 336.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 See Estate of Van Deusen, 30 Cal. 2d. 285, 288, 182 P.2d 565, 569 (1947); Staley v.
Ligon, 239 Md. 61, 69, 210 A.2d 384, 388-89 (1965).
221
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expanded the equitable deviation doctrine to permit the modification
of a trust’s distributive provisions.235 For example, this approach was
followed by an Alabama court in Trabits v. First National Bank of
Mobile.236 In 1943, the settlor created an inter vivos trust under
which his daughter was to receive $100 per month during her
lifetime.237 After the death of the Settlor’s daughter, the trust corpus
was to be distributed to her children and grandchildren, if any
existed.238 The trust instrument further provided that the trust
corpus would be distributed to the daughter’s estate if she died
without having any children.239
The settlor reserved the power to raise the monthly payments,
which he did on several occasions prior to his death in 1968.240 At the
time of his death, the daughter was receiving $400 per month from
the trust.241 Several years later, the daughter petitioned to either: (1)
terminate the trust; (2) order the trustee to distribute all of the trust
income to her; or (3) increase the monthly payments by an amount
which, in the court’s opinion, the settlor would have done if he were
still alive.242 The daughter alleged that the trust corpus exceeded
$150,000 and that the trust income was $7,000 per year more than
was paid out to her as a life beneficiary.243 She further contended
that:
[T]he present accumulation of corpus and the amount of
annual excess trust income added to the corpus are circumstances
that were not foreseen by the settlor and that, in order to effectuate
the original trust purpose, it has become necessary and proper either
to increase the size of the monthly payment to the beneficiary or to
terminate the trust.244
Finally, the daughter argued that because she was presently
childless and had undergone a hysterectomy, there would be no
children or grandchildren to take the trust corpus at her death.245
The lower court granted the trustee’s motion to dismiss and
the daughter appealed.246 The trustee maintained that the lower
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

See Wolcott, at 23, 56 A.2d at 641.
295 Ala. 85, 323 So.2d 353.
Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355.
Id. at 86, 323 So.2d at 355.
Id.
Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355.
Trabits, at 88, 323 So.2d at 355.
Id. at 86-88, 323 So.2d at 355.
Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355.
Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355-56.
Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 356.
Trabits, at 86, 323 So.2d 355.
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court could not grant relief unless the trust instrument was
ambiguous, which it was not.247 However, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that the terms of a trust could be modified under the
doctrine of equitable deviation, even if the terms were not
ambiguous.248 Moreover, the court declared that if the trust purposes
are not clearly expressed in the trust instrument, a court could
identify its purposes with the aid of extrinsic evidence.249 The court
reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for a
trial.250 Furthermore, the court indicated that equitable deviation
allowed the lower court to increase payments to the daughter if it
concluded that this disbursement of trust funds was consistent with
the trust purposes.
Prior to the promulgation of the Uniform Trust Code, a few
states enacted statutory versions of the equitable deviation doctrine,
enabling courts to modify the distributive terms of a trust.
Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, N.A., illustrates some
of the issues that arose in connection with these statutes.251 In this
case, the settlor, who died in 1966, created a testamentary trust and
directed his trustee to pay Elizabeth Hamerstrom $150 per month for
life.252 At her death, the trust corpus was to be distributed to
Elizabeth’s husband, Davis, and if Davis predeceased Elizabeth, the
settlor directed the trustees to distribute the trust corpus to Eric and
Edward Hamerstrom.253 In 1989, Elizabeth petitioned the lower court
to increase the payment to her to $2,000 per month.254 Davis, Eric,
and Edward consented to the proposed modification.255
Elizabeth alleged that inflation, her husband’s retirement, and
increased health care costs had resulted in an unforeseen change in
her economic condition.256 She also claimed that the trust corpus of
$425,000 currently generated income of $26,000 per year; therefore,
the trustee could increase her payments without having to invade the
trust corpus.257 The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of any unknown or unascertained
remaindermen.258
The guardian ad litem objected because the
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at 89, 323 So.2d at 357.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91, 323 So.2d at 358.
808 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 435.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 435.
Id.
Id.
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proposed deviation would not benefit the remaindermen.259 The trial
court agreed, and refused to approve the proposed modification.260
The Hamerstrom case arose in Missouri, which enacted an
equitable deviation statute in 1983.261 The statute provided that a
court may vary the terms of a trust “only upon finding that such
variation will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained
beneficiaries . . . .”262 The issue was whether the term “beneficiaries”
in the statute included unnamed and unascertained potential
survivors of Eric and Edward, or whether the term was limited to
beneficiaries who were expressly mentioned in the trust.263 The court
observed that there was a split of authority on this issue.264 States
that had adopted the Uniform Probate Code defined beneficiary to
include “a person who has any present or future interest, vested or
contingent.”265 However, other states had limited beneficiaries to
those who were currently receiving income from the trust, thereby
excluding remaindermen.266 Without adopting one view or the other,
the court concluded that the settlor intended to limit the distribution
of the trust corpus to Eric and Edward, and that he did not intend to
include their heirs as possible beneficiaries.267 Consequently, the
court held that the trial court should have granted Elizabeth’s
petition to modify the distributive provisions of the trust.268
C. Summary
It is very difficult to terminate or modify an irrevocable trust
in jurisdictions that follow the traditional rules. While a trust can be
terminated (even without court approval) if the settlor and all of the
beneficiaries agree, such an agreement may be impossible to obtain if
some of the trust beneficiaries are unborn or unascertained.
Beneficiaries who wish to terminate a trust must overcome even
greater obstacles when the trust is testamentary or when an inter
vivos trust has become irrevocable because of the death of the settlor.
In such cases, not only must all of the beneficiaries agree to terminate
the trust, but, according to the Claflin Doctrine, they must also
259

Id.
Id.
261 MO. REV. STAT. § 456.590 (2015). See also Julia C. Walker, Get Your Dead Hands Off
Me: Beneficiaries’ Right to Terminate or Modify a Trust Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67
MO. L. REV. 443, 452-54 (2002).
262 Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 435.
263 Id. at 436-37.
264 Id. at 437.
265 Id. (quoting UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(3) (2010)).
266 Id. See also In re Trusts of Campbell, 258 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1977); Lenzer v.
Falk, 68 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
267 Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 438.
268 Id.
260
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persuade a court that the proposed termination will not conflict with a
material purpose of the trust. The problem is compounded in states
that assume as a matter of law that spendthrift trusts, discretionary
trusts, support trusts, supplemental needs trusts, and trusts with
time-based requirements for vesting embody a material purpose that
is inconsistent with early termination.
Modification is also difficult.
In theory, the equitable
deviation doctrine allows a court to modify a trust in response to
unforeseen circumstances. However, in most states, the Claflin
Doctrine’s material purpose requirement must be satisfied before a
court will modify the provisions of a trust. In addition, some courts
interpret unforeseen circumstances in a way that restricts the scope of
equitable deviation. Finally, in many states, the equitable deviation
doctrine is limited to the modification of administrative provisions,
and does not permit a court to modify a trust’s distributive terms.
III. NEW APPROACHES: THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE AND THE
THIRD RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS
Certain provisions of the Uniform Trust Code and the Third
Restatement of Trusts, which were promulgated during the first
decade of the twenty-first century, expanded the power of courts to
modify or terminate irrevocable trusts. This development chipped
away at the traditional scope of dead hand control over trust property,
and significantly expanded the rights of beneficiaries.
A. Termination of Trusts
The Uniform Trust Code was first promulgated in 2000, and
was amended several times since that date. Presently, almost half of
the states have adopted the Code.269 The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts was promulgated in 2003. Both of these documents provide for
the termination of trusts, although the Restatement’s provisions are
somewhat less innovative than those of the Uniform Probate Code.
1. The Uniform Trust Code § 411
The prefatory note to article 4 of the Uniform Trust Code
declares that the “overall objective of these sections is to enhance
flexibility.”270 At the same time, the prefatory note qualifies this
objective by adding that the goal of greater flexibility must be
“consistent with the principle that preserving the settlor’s intent is

269

See Richard C. Ausness, When Is a Trust Protector a Fiduciary? 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB.
L.J. 277, 281 (2014) (citing Jesse Dukeminier & Robert H. Sitkoff, WILLS, TRUSTS &
ESTATES 389 (9th ed. 2013)).
270 UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 4, gen. cmt. (2006).
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paramount.”271 This sentiment was echoed by Professor David
English, who described the Code’s balance between the need for
increased flexibility and the need to give effect to the settlor’s intent
as follows:
Due to the increasing use in recent years of long-term trusts
there is a need for greater flexibility in the restrictive rules that apply
concerning when a trust may be terminated or modified other than as
provided in the instrument. The UTC provides for this increased
flexibility but without disturbing the principle that the primary
objective of trust law is to carry out the settlor’s intent. The result is
a liberalizing nudge, but one founded in traditional doctrine.272
The provisions of section 411 are fairly consistent with the
traditional approach to termination, as reflected in the Claflin
Doctrine.273 Section 411(a) affirms the traditional rule that a trust
may be terminated if the settlor and all of the beneficiaries agree to
terminate it.274
Section 411(b) echoes the Claflin Doctrine by
declaring that an “irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent
of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the
trust is not necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust.”275
However, section 411(c) departs somewhat from the traditional
approach by stating that there is no presumption that the existence of
a spendthrift clause in the trust constitutes a material purpose.276
Moreover, section 411(e) provides that a court may terminate a trust,
even when some of the beneficiaries do not consent, if (1) the court
could terminate the trust if all of the beneficiaries could consent, and
(2) the interests of non-consenting beneficiaries are adequately
protected.277
Furthermore, section 412(a) declares that a court may
terminate a trust if, due to circumstances not anticipated by the
settlor, termination would further the purposes of the trust.278
Section 105(b)(4) states that these provisions are “mandatory rules,”
which cannot be overridden by the settlor.279 Another provision of the
Uniform Trust Code permits a court to remove a trustee not only for
breach of trust, but also when removal is requested by all of the

271

Id.
David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169 (2002) (citations omitted).
273 See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 470.
274 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(a).
275 Id. § 411(b).
276 Id. § 411(c).
277 Id. § 411(e)(1-2).
278 Id. § 412(a).
279 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4).
272
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beneficiaries, and the court finds that “removal of the trustee best
serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent
with a material purpose of the trust.”280 Finally, several provisions of
the Code liberalize the rules relating to virtual representation,
thereby making it easier to terminate a trust when some of the
beneficiaries are unborn, underage, or unascertained.281
2. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts
Although their basic approaches are similar, the Restatement
Third appears to give less weight to the settlor’s intent than the
Uniform Trust Code does.282 For example, section 65(1) declares that
“[e]xcept as stated in Subsection (2), if all of the beneficiaries of an
irrevocable trust consent, they can compel the termination . . . of the
trust.”283 However, section 65(2) provides that the beneficiaries
cannot compel the termination of a trust if it “would be inconsistent
with a material purpose of the trust” unless one of two conditions is
met; either the settlor must consent to termination of the trust (a
provision that is consistent with the traditional rule) or if the court
“determines that the reason(s) for termination . . . outweigh the
material purpose.”284
The balancing test embodied in section 65(2) represents a
marked departure from the traditional approach.285 This test was
modeled after section 15403(b) of the California Probate Code, which
declares:
If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a
material purpose of the trust, the trust cannot be modified or
terminated unless the court, in its discretion, determines that the
reason for doing so under the circumstances outweighs the interest in
accomplishing a material purpose of the trust.286
Finally, comment a to section 65 changes the way the material
purpose requirement is applied to spendthrift and discretionary
provisions.287 Specifically, comment e states that while spendthrift
and discretionary provisions may suggest that the settlor had a
material purpose that would be inconsistent with early termination of
the trust, these “restrictions are not sufficient in and of themselves to

280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

Id. § 706(b)(4) (2013).
Id. §§ 301-305 (2013).
See generally, UNIF. TRUST CODE, and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(1).
Id. § 65(2).
See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 473.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403(b) (Deering 2015).
See Gallanis, supra note 51, at 228.
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establish, or to create a presumption of, a material purpose that
would prevent termination by consent of all of the beneficiaries.”288
Taken together, these provisions make it easier for beneficiaries to
obtain judicial termination of a trust.
3. Recent Cases
A number of courts have applied the termination provisions of
the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement Third during the last
decade.289 However, in some instances, the courts have chosen to
modify a trust instead of terminating it. For example, in the case of
In re Estate of Somers, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the
effect of a spendthrift clause on a beneficiary’s right to terminate an
irrevocable trust.290
In her will, Eula Somers established a
testamentary trust in which she provided for monthly payments of
$100.00 to each of her two grandchildren, Susan Somers and Kent
Somers, for their lives with a gift over to the Shriners Hospitals for
Crippled Children.291 The grandchildren’s interest was subject to a
spendthrift clause.292 The trust corpus was about $120,000 at Eula’s
death in 1956, but had grown to $3.5 million by 2001.293 At that time,
Shriners Hospitals and the grandchildren reached an agreement
under which Susan and Kent would each receive $150,000 and the
remainder of the trust would be distributed to the Shriners
Hospitals.294 When the beneficiaries sought judicial termination of
the trust pursuant to their agreement, the lower court refused.295
Instead, the court ordered a partial termination of the trust, with
$500,000 to be retained to fund annuity payments to the
grandchildren, and the remainder to be distributed to the Shriners
Hospitals.296
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court observed that the state
legislature had recently enacted provisions of the Uniform Trust
Code, including sections 410 and 411.297 The grandchildren relied on
section 411(b) to support their petition for termination.298 In their
288

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65, general cmt. e.
See, e.g., Hamel, at1072, 299 P.3d at 286; In re Estate of Oswald, 45 Kan. App. 2d 106,
244 P.3d 698 (2010); Somers, at 761, 89 P.3d at 898; Brams Trust v. Haydon, 266 S.W.3d
300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); In re Cove Irrevocable Trust, 179 Vt. 587, 893 A.2d 344 (2006).
290 277 Kan. 761, 89 P.3d 898.
291 Id. at 762-63, 89 P.3d at 901.
292 Id. at 764-65, 89 P.3d at 902.
293 Id. at 762-63, 89 P.3d at 901.
294 Id. at 763, 89 P.3d at 901. The Shriners Hospitals also agreed to continue the monthly
payments to the grandchildren. Somers, at 763, 89 P.3d at 901.
295 Id. at 763, 89 P.3d at 901.
296 Id. at 763-64, 89 P.3d at 901.
297 Id. at 765-66, 89 P.3d at 902-03.
298 Id. at 766, 89 P.3d at 903.
289
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view, continuance of the trust was not necessary to achieve any
material purpose.299 However, unlike the Uniform Trust Code’s
version, the Kansas statute contained an additional provision, which
declared that “[a] spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is
presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust.”300 In light of
this provision, the court ruled that the grandchildren were required to
produce evidence to rebut the presumption raised by the statute.301
However, they were unable to establish sufficient evidence.302 The
court also rejected the argument that the proposed annuity could take
the place of payments from the trust.303 According to the court, the
annuity payments would not be protected from the claims of creditors
and, therefore, would not satisfy the settlor’s protective objective as
well as a spendthrift clause would.304 Nevertheless, relying on the
equitable deviation principle embodied in section 412 of the Uniform
Trust Code, the court concluded that the unexpected growth of the
trust corpus justified a modification of its terms.305 Therefore, the
court ordered: (1) for $500,000 to be retained in the trust and subject
to the spendthrift clause, (2) the trustee make monthly payments to
the grandchildren, and (3) the remainder of the trust corpus be
distributed to Shriners Hospitals.306
The Vermont case of In re Cove Irrevocable Trust, relying
partly on the Third Restatement, also decided to modify a trust
instead of terminating it.307 In that case, Anne Marden created a
family trust, where the trust corpus consisted entirely of a certain
piece of real property on Lake Champlain.308 The trust provided that
the property was not to be sold until 2024, and the proceeds of the
sale were to be divided among three of the settlor’s five children or
their issue.309 In 2003, Anne’s sons, Elliot and George, brought an
action in their capacity as trustees to permit the property to be
sold.310 Anne originally opposed the sale, but eventually agreed to
it.311 However, the parties failed to agree on the disposition of the
sale proceeds, so the case went to trial.312 The trial court ruled that it
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
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310
311
312

Somers, 277 Kan. at 766, 89 P.3d at 903
Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-411(c) (2003)).
Id. at 769, 89 P.3d at 905.
Id.
Id. at 767, 89 P.3d at 903.
Somers, at 767, 89 P.3d at 903.
Id. at 770, 89 P.3d at 905.
Id. at 771, 89 P.3d at 906.
179 Vt. 587, 893 A.2d 344.
Id. at 587, 893 A.2d at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 587, 893 A.2d at 345.
Cove, at 587, 893 A.2d at 345.
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was still possible to carry out the primary purpose of the trust, and
refused to terminate it.313 Anne appealed the lower court’s judgment,
claiming that the trust failed and the proceeds of the sale should have
reverted to her by way of a resulting trust.314
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the lower
court that the primary goal of the trust was “to preserve assets for the
use of Marden’s three named sons and their children.”315 The court
determined that this goal could still be achieved if the trust was
preserved and funded with the proceeds of the sale.316 The court
expressly relied on section 66 of the Third Restatement to justify
modifying the trust in this manner.317
The beneficiaries were more successful in the Kansas case of
In re the Estate of Oswald.318 The case involved a trust established by
Irma Oswald and funded by a pour-over provision in her will.319 Irma
died in 2008, survived by all five of her children.320 After Irma’s
death, some of her children petitioned the court to terminate the trust
and distribute its assets to the trust beneficiaries.321 One of her
children, Lloyd, opposed termination, relying on a provision in the
trust that allowed him to farm all real estate owned by the trust as
long as he desired.322 As executor of Irma’s estate, Lloyd proposed to
execute deeds for 1,340 acres of farmland to the various beneficiaries,
but hold the deeds in escrow until he retired or ceased farming.323
Another child, Henrietta Werth, objected to the proposal, and
demanded that all of the trust assets, including title to Irma’s real
property, be distributed immediately.324
At trial, Lloyd argued that permitting him to farm the land
was a “primary purpose” of the trust.325 In contrast, Henrietta
maintained that the trust required the immediate distribution of the
trust property at Irma’s death, and did not authorize Lloyd to hold
title to any of the farmland in escrow.326 The trial court ruled that all
of the trust assets, including title to the farmland, should be
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
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324
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Id. at 588, 893 A.2d at 346.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588-89, 893 A.2d at 347.
Cove, 179 Vt. at 588, 893 A.2d at 347.
45 Kan.App.2d 106, 244 P.3d 698.
Id. at 107-08, 244 P.3d at 699-700.
Id. at 109, 244 P.3d at 701.
Id. at 107, 244 P.3d at 699.
Id. at 109, 244 P.3d at 700.
Oswald, at 109, 244 P.3d at 701.
Id. at 110, 244 P.3d at 701.
Id. at 110-11, 244 P.3d at 701-02.
Id. at 111, 244 P.3d at 702.
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immediately distributed to the trust beneficiaries.327 It also declared
that Lloyd could farm the land as a tenant of his other siblings.328
On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals agreed that Irma
intended for the trust to terminate at her death, and rejected the
claim that the trust should continue as long as Lloyd conducted
farming operations on the land.329 In doing so, the court also rejected
the assertion that protecting Lloyd’s right to farm was a material
purpose of the trust.330 Quoting from section 65 of the Third
Restatement, the court declared that it would not readily infer a
material purpose; instead, the proponent would be required to provide
evidence of a “particular concern or objective on the part of the
settlor.”331 The court found that the settlor could have given Lloyd a
life estate in the property if protecting his right to farm was an
overriding concern,332 and therefore, it affirmed the trial court’s
judgment.333
Finally, Brams Trust v. Haydon334 provides an interesting
insight on use of virtual representation in a petition to terminate a
trust under section 411(b) of the Uniform Trust Code.335 The Brams
case involved a testamentary trust established by the will of Harriett
Brams.336 The trust authorized the trustees, in the exercise of their
discretion, to distribute any or all of the trust income to Harriett’s
grandson, Michael Brams.337 Michael was also given a testamentary
power of appointment to distribute portions of the trust corpus to his
descendants, born or unborn.338 If Michael failed to appoint the trust
property, it would be distributed to his issue then living, per stirpes,
as takers in default.339 Harriett died in 2002; in 2005, Michael filed a
petition to terminate the trust pursuant to section 411(b) of the

327

Id.
Oswald, at 111, 244 P.3d at 702.
329 Id. at 112-13, 244 P.3d at 702-03.
330 Id. at 114, 244 P.3d at 703.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Oswald, at 111, 244 P.3d at 702.
334 266 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
335 Virtual representation allows a living member of a beneficiary class, a fiduciary or a
parent to represent the interests of unborn, unknown or underage members of the class in
litigation and family settlements. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 304 (2013); Susan T. Bart &
Lyman W. Welch, State Statutes on Virtual Representation—A New State Survey, 35
ACTEC J. 368 (2009).
336 Haydon, 266 S.W.3d at 302.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id.
328
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Missouri Uniform Trust Code.340
At the time the petition was filed, Michael was thirty-two
years old and had no children.341 The trial court issued an order to
terminate the trust, but made no finding that the unborn or
unascertained beneficiaries of the trust would benefit from its early
termination.342 However, this finding was required by a state statute
that governed irrevocable trusts created before 2005.343 The trial
court assumed that section 456.3-302 allowed Michael to represent
potential appointees and takers in default in his petition for
termination.344
The statute declared that “[t]he holder of a
testamentary power of appointment may represent and bind persons
whose interests, as permissible appointees, takers in default, or
otherwise, are subject to the power.”345 However, the appeals court
concluded that Michael was given a special, not a general, power of
appointment; therefore, he could not represent the interests of the
takers in default.346 Since Michael had not met the requirements of
section 456.590.2, the court held that the trial court erred in
terminating the trust.347
B. Modification of Trusts
1. The Uniform Trust Code
Several provisions of the Uniform Trust Code are concerned
with the modification of trusts. Section 411 follows the traditional
approach by allowing the settlor and the trust beneficiaries to modify
the terms of the trust by unanimous agreement.348 This section also
allows a trust to be modified by the beneficiaries alone if the proposed
modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the
trust.349 Section 412 also adopts the traditional view by declaring
that a court may modify the terms of a trust when, because of
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification is necessary
to further the purposes of the trust.350 Section 412(a) expands the
conventional doctrine of equitable deviation by expressly stating that
a court may modify a trust’s distributive provisions if such action is

340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350

Haydon, 266 S.W.3d at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 456.590 (2015).
Haydon, 266 S.W.3d at 304.
Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 456.3-302 (2014)).
Id. at 305.
Id. at 306.
See English, supra note 272, at 169-70.
Id. at 170.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2013).
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necessary to further trust purposes.351 In addition, section 412(b)
allows a court, without regard to changed circumstances, to modify an
administrative provision if continuing the trust on its existing terms
would be impracticable, wasteful, or would impair the trust’s
administration.352 Section 414 authorizes courts to modify a trust
when the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of
administration.353 Section 416 authorizes a court to modify a trust in
order to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives.354 Finally, section 706
allows a court to remove a trustee without cause when requested by
the beneficiaries.355
2. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts
Sections 65 and 66 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts also
reflect some new thinking about the modification of trusts. Section
65, which applies to both termination and modification, declares that
the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust may modify the trust if all
consent and the proposed modification is not inconsistent with a
material purpose of the trust.356 If the material purpose requirement
is not satisfied, the beneficiaries can still compel modification if the
settlor consents or if a court determines that the reasons for the
proposed modification outweigh the material purpose.357
As
previously mentioned, this balancing approach weakens the material
purpose requirement, making it easier for a court to modify the terms
of a trust.358 Furthermore, unlike section 66, this provision does not
require a finding of unanticipated circumstances.359
Section 66 sets forth the Restatement’s version of the
equitable deviation doctrine. It provides that:
The court may modify an administrative or distributive
provision of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an
administrative or distributive provision, if because of circumstances
not anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation will
further the purposes of the trust.360
This language broadens the scope of the traditional equitable
deviation doctrine in several respects. First, it clearly states that a
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360

See English, supra note 272, at 172.
Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 175.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2).
Id.
See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 450.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66, general cmt. a (2003).
Id. at § 66(1).
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court may modify distributive, as well as administrative, provisions of
a trust. Second, comment a states that section 66 does not require a
showing of changed circumstances; instead, proponents of
modification merely have to show that “the settlor was unaware of the
circumstances in establishing the terms of the trust.”361
3. Recent Cases
In recent years, a number of cases have tackled various issues
raised by the modification provisions of the Uniform Trust Code and
the Third Restatement of Trusts.
First, the material purpose
requirement remains an issue as the case of In re Trust D Created
Under Last Will & Testament of Darby illustrates.362 Senator Harry
Darby established several testamentary trusts for the benefit of his
sister and daughters.363 Trust D provided a payment of $4,000 to one
of the daughters, Marjorie Alford, during her lifetime, with a gift over
to Marjorie’s daughters for their lives and then to the issue of each of
her daughters.364 The trust also contained a spendthrift clause.365
Darby later increased Marjorie’s annual distribution to $24,000 per
year.366 Darby died in 1987, and in 2009, Marjorie petitioned the
court to modify Trust D to increase her annual payments to $40,000
per year.367 Marjorie claimed that payments from the trust were no
longer adequate to satisfy her basic living expenses.368 All of the
qualified trust beneficiaries consented to the proposed modification,
and the lower court approved Marjorie’s petition.369
Reviewing the lower court’s actions, the appeals court
considered whether it was authorized to modify the trust under two
state statutes that corresponded to sections 411(b) and 412(a) of the
Uniform Trust Code.370 The court began by observing that a trust
cannot be modified under section 411(b), notwithstanding the fact
that all of the beneficiaries have consented, unless it is consistent
with a material purpose of the trust.371 In order to determine whether
that requirement was met, the court had to identify the trust’s
material purpose. Quoting from one of the Third Restatement’s
comments, the court declared that material purposes could not be

361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371

Id. at § 66, general cmt. a.
290 Kan. 785, 234 P.3d 793.
Id. at 787, 234 P.3d at 796.
Id. at 787-88, 234 P.3d at 796-97.
Id. at 788, 234 P.3d at 797.
Darby, at 788, 234 P.3d at 797.
Id.
Id. at 789, 234 P.3d at 798.
Id. at 789-90, 234 P.3d at 798.
Id. at 790-91, 234 P.3d at 798-99.
Darby, at 791, 234 P.3d at 799.
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readily inferred.372 A material purpose requires the proponent to
show that the settlor had a particular concern or objective in creating
the trust.373
Applying this rule, the court rejected Marjorie’s contention
that a material purpose of the trust was to provide for her basic
support.374 It noted that the trust was not a support trust; rather, it
provided for a specific payment to Marjorie without any connection to
her support needs.375 On the other hand, the court determined that
the presence of a spendthrift provision in the trust indicated that one
of the settlor’s material purposes for the trust was to protect the
interests of the remainder beneficiaries.376
An increase in
distributions to Marjorie would be inconsistent with that objective.377
Consequently, the court concluded Marjorie’s request was not
authorized by section 411(b).378
A number of other cases have also been decided recently under
the Uniform Trust Code and Third Restatement regimes.379 For
example, in the case of In re Nobbe, the Indiana Appellate Court,
relied on section 412 of the Uniform Trust Code and suggested that
equitable deviation could be used to modify the distributive provisions
of a trust.380 The case involved a dispute among nine brothers and
sisters over the terms of a testamentary trust created by their father
in 1982.381 The testator, Edwin Nobbe, bequeathed to his wife,
Loretta, an amount sufficient to obtain the maximum marital estate
tax deduction.382 The remainder of Edwin’s estate was to be placed in
trust with Loretta as the income beneficiary.383 At her death, the
corpus of the trust was to be distributed to Edwin’s children free of
trust.384 However, Item VII of the will left certain bank stock in equal
shares to three of Edwin’s children, Marlene, Herman, and Susan.385
At Edwin’s death, his personal representative transferred 500 shares
372

Id. at 792, 234 P.3d at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64, cmt. d
(2003)).
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 791-92, 234 P.3d at 799.
376 Darby, at 792, 234 P.3d at 799.
377 Id. at 793, 234 P.3d at 800.
378 Id.
379 See, e.g., Ruby G. Owen Trust ex rel. Owen, 2012 Ark. 381, 418 S.W.3d 421, 422 (2012);
Chapman, 953 N.E.2d at 580-82); In re Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Darby,
290 Kan. 785, 234 P.3d 793; In re Riddell, 138 Wash. App. 485, 157 P.3d 888 (2007).
380 831 N.E.2d 835.
381 Id. at 836-37.
382 Id. at 837.
383 Id.
384 Id. at 837.
385 Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d at 838.
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of the bank stock, then worth $40,000, to the trust.386 However,
during the period between Edwin’s death in 1982 and Loretta’s death
in 2003, changes in the banking laws caused the stock to increase in
value by more than $3 million.387
Shortly after Loretta’s death, the Trustee petitioned for
instructions regarding distribution of the trust corpus to the
children.388 Later, in a separate petition, the other children (“the
Appellees”) argued that Edwin merely intended to leave Marlene,
Herman, and Susan (“the Appellants”) the value of the stock at the
time of his death ($40,000).389 Alternatively, the Appellees asked the
court to approve a deviation from the trust because “‘the distribution
of the trust proposed by the Trustee would defeat or substantially
impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, that is
Edwin’s intent to treat his nine children ‘equally or substantially
equally.’”390 The trial court agreed with this interpretation and
ordered the trustee to distribute $40,000 to the Appellants, and to
distribute the remaining stock in equal shares to all nine children.391
The Appellants then appealed.392
The appeals court held that the will, by its express terms,
made a specific bequest of the bank stock to the Appellants.393
Therefore, unless the will was modified, all of the bank stock,
including dividends and accretions, would be distributed to the
Appellants when the trust is terminated.394 The court considered the
Appellees’ argument that Edwin intended to treat all of his children
more or less equally, and his failure to foresee changes in state
banking laws constituted an unforeseen circumstance that completely
impaired his estate plan.395 In response, the Appellants contended
that equitable deviation only allowed a court to modify the
administrative provisions of a trust.396 However, the Appellees
pointed out that both the Third Restatement and section 412(a) of the
Uniform Trust Code provided that equitable deviation could be
applied to modify distributive as well as administrative provisions of a
trust.397 Furthermore, the appeals court noted, the state legislature
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397

Id.
Id.
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 839.
Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d. at 839.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 841.
Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d. at 841.
Id. at 841-42.
Id. at 842.
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had recently adopted the Uniform Trust Code, including § 412(a).398
The final question considered was whether significant changes
in state banking laws were unforeseeable to the testator. The court
concluded that this was not the sort of unforeseen circumstance that
was required to justify the use of equitable deviation.399 In the first
place, the court determined that changes in state banking laws were
foreseeable, and that officers of the bank informed shareholders –
including Edwin – as early as 1979 that such changes were likely to
occur in the future.400 In addition, the court declared that an increase
in the value of a trust asset was not the sort of economic change that
the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code considered to be
sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable deviation.401 The court
concluded by declaring that “[w]e will not, over twenty years later,
step in and redistribute Edwin’s estate in an attempt to equalize the
devises at this point in time.”402 Accordingly, it reversed the lower
court’s judgment in favor of the Appellees.403
However, unforeseen circumstances may be sufficient to allow
the conversion of an ordinary beneficial interest into one protected by
a supplemental needs trust.404 For example, in the case of In Re
Riddell,405 a Washington appeals court invoked the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts to authorize a lower court to employ equitable
deviation to convert the interest of one of the settlor’s grandchildren
into a supplemental needs trust.406 George and Irene Riddell had
created several trusts for the benefit of their son, Ralph, and his wife
Beverly, as well as Ralph’s children, Donald and Nancy.407 The trusts
provided, inter alia, that after Ralph and Beverly died, Donald and
Nancy would receive the trust corpus when they reached the age of
thirty-five.408 Unfortunately, Nancy suffered from a number of
serious psychological disorders and was confined to a state mental

398

Id.
Id. at 842-43.
400 Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d. at 842-43.
401 Id. at 843.
402 Id. at 843.
403 Id.
404 See Owen, at 381, 418 S.W.3d at 422; White v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 40 Kan. App.
2d 971, 981, 198 P.3d 172, 180 (2008); Riddell, 138 Wash. App. at 485, 157 P.3d at 888. “A
supplemental needs trust is a trust that is established for the disabled person’s benefit and
that is intended to supplement public benefits without increasing countable assets and
resources so as to disqualify the individual from public benefits.” Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at
495, 157 P.3d at 892.
405 Riddell, 138 Wash.App. 485, 157 P.3d 888.
406 Id. at 488, 157 P.3d at 889.
407 Id. at 488-89, 157 P.3d at 889-90.
408 Id. at 489, 157 P.3d at 890.
399
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hospital.409
In his capacity as trustee of the Riddell trusts, Ralph filed a
petition asking the court to modify the trust so that Nancy’s share
would not be distributed to her outright, but instead transferred to a
supplemental needs trust so that it would not be subject to
attachment by the state for the cost of her health care.410 At the time
the petition was brought, both Donald and Nancy had reached the age
of thirty-five, and would receive the trust corpus outright at their
parents’ deaths.411 However, the trial court refused to modify the
trusts because it concluded that, even if the settlors did not foresee
Nancy’s mental situation, converting her interest into a supplemental
needs trust would not further the overall purpose of the trust.412 On
appeal, Ralph argued that the equitable deviation doctrine, as set
forth in the Third Restatement, authorized a court to modify a trust
in the manner requested.413 He contended that the settlors, by
requiring their grandchildren to reach the age of thirty-five before
receiving the trust assets, demonstrated an intent that they achieve a
certain level of maturity and stability before obtaining full ownership
of the trust property.414 Had they anticipated Nancy’s debilitating
mental condition, the Riddells would not have left the trust property
to her outright.415
The appeals court declared that it would rely on the
Washington Supreme Court’s analysis of equitable deviation in
Niemann v. Vaughn Community Church,416 which applied that
doctrine to modify the administrative provisions of a charitable
trust.417 According to the appeals court, the court in Niemann
adopted a two-pronged approach to determine if modification of a
trust is permissible.418
This approach is based on the Third
Restatement, and states that a court may modify an administrative or
distributive provision: (1) “because of circumstances not anticipated
by the settlor,” and (2) “the modification or deviation would further
the purposes of the trust.”419 According to the Riddell court, the
Restatement gave courts broader discretion in the area of trust
modification than the traditional rule.
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419

Id.
Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at 489, 157 P.3d at 890.
Id.
Id. at 491, 157 P.3d at 890-91.
Id. at 492, 157 P.3d at 891.
Id. at 492-93, 157 P.3d at 891.
Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at 492, 157 P.3d at 891.
Id. at 493, 157 P.3d at 891 (citing Niemann, 154 Wash. 2d 365, 113 P.3d 463).
Id.
Id. at 493, 157 P.3d at 891-92.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (internal citations omitted)).
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Applying these criteria, the court in Riddell determined that
Nancy’s grandparents could not have anticipated that she would
become mentally incapacitated and unable to manage her financial
affairs.420
Nor could they have anticipated passage of federal
legislation that authorized the creation of supplemental needs
trusts.421
Furthermore, the court found that these changed
circumstances had frustrated the settlors’ intent that Nancy be given
the trust property to use as she saw fit.422 Consequently, the court
concluded that since Nancy would never be able to manage the trust
as she chose, transferring the funds to a supplemental needs trust
would at least protect it from attachment by the state during her
lifetime.423 Therefore, the court remanded the case back to the trial
court, and directed it to “order such equitable deviation as is
consistent with the settlors’ intent in light of changed
circumstances.”424
A change in the tax laws is another type of unforeseen
circumstance that has led trustees and beneficiaries to petition courts
to modify a trust under the doctrine of equitable deviation.425 As
previously discussed, section 416 of the Uniform Trust Code
specifically authorizes courts to modify trust provisions in response to
changes in existing tax laws, as long as the proposed modification is
not contrary to the settlor’s probable intent.426 However, section 416’s
“probable intent” language may create problems when the proposed
modification changes the trust’s distributive provisions.
This issue arose in the Darby case,427 discussed supra Section
III.B.3. In that case, Marjorie Alford asked the court to grant her a
limited testamentary power of appointment.428 The purpose was to
vest the assets of the trust in her estate, thereby subjecting them to
federal estate tax liability, but not to federal generation-skipping
transfer (“GST”) tax liability.429 Because the estate tax exemption
exceeded the value of the trust, the proposed modification would have
reduced the Darby family’s overall tax liability.430 According to
420

Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at 494, 157 P.3d at 892.
Id. at 494-95, 157 P.3d at 892.
422 Id. at 494, 157 P.3d at 892.
423 Id. at 495-96, 157 P.3d at 893.
424 Id. at 496, 157 P.3d at 893.
425 See Darby, at 795, 234 P.3d at 798-99; In re Harris Testamentary Trust, 275 Kan. 946,
69 P.3d 1109 (2003); Head v. Head, 261 Ore. App. 471, 483, 323 P.3d 505, 507 (2014).
426 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (2013).
427 See Darby, 290 Kan. 785, 234 P.3d 793).
428 Id. at 796, 234 P.3d at 801.
429 Id.
430 Id.
On the other hand, if the trust property had been distributed to Darby’s
grandchildren as his will provided, it would have been subjected to a 45% tax rate under the
provisions of GST tax. Id. at 802.
421
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Marjorie, at the time the trust was created, a GST could effectively
avoid federal estate taxation on trust assets passed to each
generation; however, changes in the federal GST tax and increases in
the estate tax exemption seriously undercut Darby’s GST strategy.431
Although the court conceded that Darby “could have done a far better
job of tax planning had he desired to avoid the GSTT implications for
Trust D,” it nevertheless refused to modify the trust because the
proposed modification was completely contrary to the settlor’s
intent.432 His intent was reflected by the presence of a spendthrift
clause in his will, which would preserve the trust’s assets for the
second and third generations.433
Finally, section 706 of the Uniform Trust Code allows a court
to remove a trustee without cause at the request of the
beneficiaries.434 By threatening to have the trustee removed, the
living beneficiaries can pressure the trustee to modify the trust terms
(if the trustee has the power to do so) in a way that is more to their
liking.435 Davis v. U.S. Bank National Association provides an
illustration of the Code’s expansive approach to trustee removal.436 In
that case, Lorenz Ayers executed a trust instrument that appointed
National Association as trustee, and named Harold Davis as the
income beneficiary.437 After Harold’s death, the trust corpus was to
be divided among his living children in equal shares.438 If there were
no surviving children, the trust property was to go to Lorenz’s heirs at
law, and otherwise to Lafayette College in Pennsylvania.439 At the
time of the litigation, Harold had two children, Dillon and
Marguerite.440
In 2006, Harold filed a petition to remove National as trustee,
transfer the situs of the trust to Delaware, and appoint a Delaware
trust company as trustee.441 There was no allegation of wrongdoing
by National; however, Harold argued that its removal as trustee
would serve the interests of all of the trust beneficiaries, and would
not be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.442 Affirming
the lower court, the appellate court concluded that a state statute
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442

Darby, at 797, 234 P.3d at 802.
Id. at 799, 234 P.3d at 803.
Id. at 799-800, 234 P.3d at 803-04.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4).
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1335.
243 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 426.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 243 S.W.3d at 426.
Id.
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based on section 706(b)(4) of the Uniform Trust Code authorized the
court to remove the current trustee because the petitioner had
presented evidence that the Delaware trustee would charge lower fees
for the same level of service.443
C. Summary
Both the Uniform Trust Code and the Third Restatement have
relaxed the traditional rules regarding termination and modification
of trusts.444 Insofar as termination is concerned, section 411(b)
appears to reaffirm the Claflin Doctrine. However, section 411(c)
qualifies this by eliminating the presumption that a spendthrift
provision indicates that the settlor would not want to terminate the
trust prematurely. In addition, section 411(e) does away with the
requirement that all beneficiaries consent to the termination of a
trust. Finally, section 412 allows a court to terminate a trust when
circumstances arise that were not anticipated by the settlor if
termination would further the purposes of the trust. Thus, these
provisions significantly liberalize the traditional requirements for
termination.
The Third Restatement goes even further in this direction.
Section 65(2) allows a court to terminate a trust if it determines that
the reasons supporting termination outweigh a material purpose of
the trust. In addition, comment e to section 65 declares that
spendthrift and discretionary provisions do not create a presumption
that early termination was contrary to a material purpose of the
trust.
The Uniform Trust Code and the Third Restatement have also
made it easier for courts to modify the terms of a trust. For example,
section 412(a) of the Uniform Trust Code expands the equitable
deviation doctrine by authorizing a court to modify the distributive
provisions of a trust if it concludes that modification is necessary to
further the purposes of the trust. Furthermore, section 412(b) allows
a court to modify administrative provisions, even in the absence of
changed circumstances, if retaining the existing trust terms would be
impracticable, wasteful, or would impair the administration of the
trust. Section 66 of the Third Restatement also extends the equitable
deviation doctrine to distributive provisions, and allows a court to
modify the terms of a trust in the absence of changed circumstances if
it concludes that the settlor was unaware of an existing circumstance
at the time the trust was established.

443
444

Id. at 431.
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1329.
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IV. MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION BY TRUSTEES AND
TRUST PROTECTORS
Although trust beneficiaries may agree among themselves to
modify or terminate the terms of a trust, trustees may seek judicial
approval to protect themselves against potential liability for failing to
carry out the original terms of the trust. A judicial decree may also be
required if some of the beneficiaries are unborn, underage, or
undetermined. Furthermore, even though the Uniform Trust Code
and the Third Restatement have liberalized the traditional rules
relating to the modification and termination of trusts, they still
contemplate that judicial authorization will be needed in most
instances.445 However, this sort of judicial involvement in trust
management is not always desirable, either from the perspective of
the trustee, the trust beneficiaries, or the efficient management of
judicial resources.446 Fortunately, settlors can employ a number of
devices to avoid the need for judicial action. Essentially, these
alternatives involve authorizing a trustee or a trust protector to
terminate or modify a trust without the need for judicial approval.
A. Modification or Termination by a Trustee
For many years, courts have upheld the exercise of a trustee’s
discretion in terminating a trust.447 However, two related questions
have arisen in connection with the exercise of this power: (1) what
standard of conduct applies to a trustee’s exercise of this power; and
(2) what standard of review should apply when a court is called upon
to evaluate the propriety of a trustee’s actions? Both of these issues
arose in American Cancer Society, St. Louis Division v.
Hammerstein.448
In that case, Lena Kohler established a
testamentary trust for her daughter, Virginia Knoll, and son-in-law,
John Knoll, Jr.449 Under the terms of the trust, Virginia was to
receive the income from the trust during her lifetime; at her death, if
John survived Virginia, he would receive the income from the trust
until his death or remarriage.450 However, the trustee had discretion
to terminate the trust during the lifetime of Virginia or John when
445

See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 609.
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1331.
447 See, e.g., Matter of McManus’ Estate, 407 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184, 62 A.D.2d 758, 764 (1978);
In re Eckert’s Trust, 23 A.D.2d 32, 35-36, 258 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (1965); In re Estate of
Fishberg, 158 Misc. 3, 285 N.Y.S. 303, 307 (Sur. Ct. 1936); Major v. Major, 177 A.D. 102, 163
N.Y.S. 925 (1917). See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (declaring that “[t]he terms of the
trust may confer upon a trustee . . . a power to direct the modification or termination of the
trust.” See also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1332 (highlighting that a non-trustee
can be given a non-fiduciary special power of appointment to appoint trust principal).
448 631 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
449 Id. at 860.
450 Id. at 861.
446
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either became the sole beneficiary of the trust.451 Finally, if the trust
did not terminate at the death (or remarriage) of the last income
beneficiary, the trustee was directed to distribute the trust corpus to
various other beneficiaries, including the American Cancer Society.452
Virginia died in 1966, and John became the trust’s sole income
beneficiary.453
In 1970, the trustee notified the remainder
beneficiaries that he intended to terminate the trust and distribute
the trust corpus to John.454 The trust owned one-third of the shares of
the Kohler City Supply Company, a closely held corporation.455 John
“and four long-time employees of the company owned the remaining
shares.”456 Both John and the trustee, Robert Hammerstein, were
also officers and directors of the corporation.457 Hammerstein later
testified that he decided to terminate the trust in order to prevent
“chaos in the company,” as he feared would occur if the shares in the
trust were divided among a large number of beneficiaries.458
Upon receiving notice of the pending termination, the
American Cancer Society challenged the right of the trustee to
terminate the trust.459 The litigation lasted for more than ten
years.460 The lower court ruled that the attempted termination was
void because the trustee “unintentionally, in error and through
mistake” abused his discretion.461
However, the lower court’s
judgment was reversed on appeal.462 The appeals court began its
analysis of the case by declaring:
When a testator vests sole discretion in a matter in the trustee
and supplies no objective standards by which to evaluate the
reasonableness of his conduct, a court must not interfere unless the
trustee, in exercising his power, [willfully] abuses his discretion or
acts arbitrarily, fraudulently, dishonestly or with an improper

451

Id. at 860.
Id. at 859.
453 Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 861.
454 Id. at 860.
455 Id. at 861.
456 Id.
457 Id.
458 Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 861-62.
The remainder beneficiaries included four
churches, two charities and forty-two individuals or their descendants. Id.
459 Id. at 860.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 862.
462 Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 863. The appeals court concluded that the trust was
terminated in 1970 when the trustee announced his intention to terminate the trust and
distribute the trust corpus to John. Id. at 860. Although the trust assets were not
distributed until the end of the litigation, the court held that the trust property vested in
John when the trust was terminated in 1970. Id. at 865.
452
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motive.463
The court then determined that the settlor had clearly
expressed an intent to give the trustee absolute discretion to
terminate the trust and distribute the trust property to John.464
Consequently, the court concluded that the trial court erred in
overruling the trustee’s decision to terminate on the grounds that he
acted “unintentionally, erroneously and mistakenly.”465 According to
the court, the trustee’s decision would prevail unless there was a
“willful abuse of discretion or bad faith on his part.”466 In this case,
there was no finding by the appeals court that the trustee had acted
arbitrarily, dishonestly or fraudulently, or intentionally abused his
discretion.467 Furthermore, the court observed that the contingent
beneficiaries could not challenge the trustee’s decision simply because
it extinguished their interest in the trust.468 Finally, the court stated
that the trustee was not obligated to seek a court’s advice or
permission before acting to terminate the trust.469
The extinguishment of contingent interests was also at issue
in Croslow v. Croslow.470 The settlor, John Louis Croslow, established
an inter vivos trust under which the trustees were given the discretion
to pay income from the trust to Croslow or his wife and children.471
The trustees were also authorized to terminate the trust and
distribute the trust corpus to John, if living, or to his heirs, personal
representative, or devisees.472 The principal asset of the trust was a
tract of land leased to the Marathon Oil Company for the production
of natural gas.473 In 1972, the trustees terminated the trust and
conveyed the property to John and his wife, Marguerite, as joint
tenants.474 John died in 1973, and his children by a prior marriage
brought suit against Marguerite, claiming that they were trust
beneficiaries since the trustee had discretion to pay some of the trust
income to them.475
The children contended that the trustees’ action constituted a
modification of the trust, requiring the consent of all of the trust
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475

Id. at 863.
Id.
Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 863.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 865.
38 Ill. App. 3d 373, 347 N.E.2d 800 (1976).
Id. at 374-75, 347 N.E.2d at 801-02.
Id. at 374, 347 N.E.2d at 801.
Id. at 375, 347 N.E.2d at 802.
Id. at 376, 347 N.E.2d at 802.
Croslow, at 376, 347 N.E.2d at 802-03.
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beneficiaries.476 However, the court distinguished between a judicial
modification and the trust instrument that gives the power to
terminate to the trustee.477 Furthermore, the court held that if the
trustee was empowered to distribute the trust property to a
beneficiary upon termination, he could also distribute some or all of
the property to a third person at the request of the beneficiary.478
Therefore, the delivery of a deed from the trustee to John and
Marguerite as joint tenants did not constitute an improper transfer of
trust property to a non-beneficiary.479 Finally, the court declared that
“although the children of John Louis Croslow were in fact
beneficiaries under the trust while the trust was in operation upon
termination by the trustees in accordance with the discretionary
power of the trust, the children’s rights as beneficiaries were
extinguished.”480
Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the
judgment of the lower court.481
In Major v. Major,482 a New York court allowed a trustee to
terminate a trust for his own benefit even though his action
extinguished the remainder interest of his infant son.483 Major
involved a provision in the will of Richard Major, which created
income interests in trusts for each of his three sons, Frank, Richard,
and George.484 The will also provided that the trust corpus would be
distributed to each son’s issue at his death.485 Finally, the testator
declared that his executors “in the exercise of their discretion” could
terminate any of the trusts and distribute the trust property to the
income beneficiaries.486 Richard appointed each of his three sons as
executors of his estate.487 When Frank and George died, Richard
became the sole executor and trustee.488 In that capacity, Richard
decided to terminate the testamentary trust and take his share of his
father’s estate free of trust.489
However, Richard’s infant son,
Richard, Jr., challenged this action in court through a guardian ad
litem.490 On an appeal from a decision upholding the termination, the

476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490

Id. at 377, 347 N.E.2d at 803.
Id. at 377, 347 N.E.2d at 803.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS).
Id.
Croslow, at 378, 347 N.E.2d at 804.
Id.
177 A.D. 102, 163 N.Y.S. 925.
Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 928.
Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 926.
Id.
Id.
Major, at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 926.
Id.
Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 927.
Id.
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New York court affirmed, concluding that a power held in several
grantees could be exercised by the survivor.491 According to the court:
It is an informing fact that the exercise of the power depended
upon no conditions, contingencies or limitations. It was a naked
power to pay over, without the exercise of any discretion referable to
any requirement, advantage, or necessity. It was not to furnish
support, if needed, or to maintain any state of living. It was merely
an unconditional power to do something.492
It is interesting to note that the court seemed to view
Richard’s right to terminate the trust as a non-fiduciary power,
independent of his status as a trustee. Apparently, the court did not
believe that Richard owed any fiduciary duty to his son, who had a
contingent remainder interest under the trust.
The settlor may also authorize a trustee to modify the terms of
a trust. For example, section 808(c) of the Uniform Trust Code
permits a trustee to modify the terms of a trust when expressly
authorized to do so in the trust instrument.493 Of course, the power to
modify may also be limited as illustrated in Rosner v. Caplow.494 In
1947, Leo and Anna Rosner established irrevocable inter vivos trusts
for their two daughters, June and Mildred.495 Each daughter was
named as an income beneficiary with a gift over to her issue.496 The
trust instrument also created a trust for Anna.497 Leo was sole
trustee for each of these trusts.498 However, Jacob Fisher and Samuel
Ecker were named as substitute trustees in the event that Leo died or
was otherwise unable to serve as trustee.499 Over the years, the
parties entered into various agreements relating to the trusts.500 In
1951, Leo, Anna, June, and Mildred granted to Leo the right during
his lifetime to name other substitute trustees.501 At the time this
agreement was signed, June was a minor, and the sole remainderman
was Mildred’s daughter, Stacey.502
In 1963, Leo resigned as trustee, and appointed Anna and

491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502

Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 927.
Major, at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 928.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (2013).
105 Misc. 2d. 592, 432 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
Id. at 592, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rosner, at 593, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80.
Id. at 594, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
Id.
Id.
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Mildred as successor trustees.503
Several months later, June
purported to “renounce” her interest in her trust in return for a
cooperative apartment in New York City.504 In 1966, the parties
entered into another agreement under which the corpus of June’s
trust was divided into separate trusts for June’s three minor children,
Jeffrey, Wendy, and Marcey.505 Finally, in 1973, the parties entered
into another agreement, reinstating June as the beneficiary of her
former trust.506 Leo died in 1977,507 and in 1978, Anna and Mildred
agreed to name June as a third trustee.508 Nevertheless, in 1979,
June brought suit to remove her mother and sister as trustees, and to
designate herself as a successor trustee.509 June argued that the 1951
agreement, which purported to give Leo the power to name substitute
trustees, was invalid because she and her niece, Stacey, were minors
at the time.510
The court observed that the settlor of a trust could revoke or
amend it only if all persons “beneficially interested” consented.511
Although the court agreed that June did not legally consent to the
agreement in 1951, it concluded that she had effectively consented
after reaching her majority by accepting income from the trust for
many years afterward.512 On the other hand, the court found that the
1978 agreement was not valid.513
First, it declared that the
designation of an additional or successor trustee was a modification of
the trust.514 Since no power to modify was reserved in the original
trust instrument, it could have only come from the 1951 agreement.515
However, that agreement only gave the power to modify the trust to
Leo during his lifetime and not to Anna and Mildred as successor
trustees.516 Thus, the court held that Leo’s designation of Anna and
Mildred as successor trustees was valid, but their designation of June
was not.517

503

Id.
Rosner, at 594, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
505 Id. at 595, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
506 Id. at 595, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
507 Id.
508 Id. at 595-96, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
509 Rosner, at 596, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
510 Id. at 597, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
511 Id. at 597, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82.
512 Id. at 598, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
513 Id. at 600, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
514 Rosner, at 600-01, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
515 Id. at 601, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
516 Id. at 601, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
517 Id. at 601, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 584. Nor was the statutory provision allowing modification
available once Leo, one of the settlors, had died. Id.
504
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B. Decanting
In addition to express modification of the terms of a trust, in
many states, a trustee can effectively modify a trust by transferring
the trust corpus to another trust if authorized to do so in the trust
instrument.518 This practice is known as “decanting,”519 which occurs
when a trustee, who has discretion to distribute trust property to
certain beneficiaries, distributes the property to another trust created
for their benefit instead of distributing the property to them
outright.520
There are a number of benefits associated with
decanting.521 Some of the more important reasons to decant include:
(1) updating trust terms to reflect changes in the law governing the
trust; (2) modifying the distributive terms of the trust in order to
address circumstances such as changes in a beneficiary’s financial
status, marital status, or health; and (3) facilitating GST and other
tax planning for trust beneficiaries.522
1. The Common Law Power to Decant
One of the first courts to consider the validity of decanting was
the Florida Supreme Court in Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co.523 In
1932, Margarita Phipps created a trust for the benefit of her children
and their descendants.524 Margarita named her husband, John, as
individual trustee, and the Palm Beach Trust Company as corporate
trustee.525 The trust instrument provided that John, “in his sole and
absolute discretion,” could distribute trust property to any or all of the
beneficiaries.526 In 1939, John directed the corporate trustee to
transfer the trust corpus to a new trust, which had slightly different
provisions.527 The corporate trustee requested the court to determine
whether the individual trustee had the power to appoint the property
in further trust.528 The court ruled that John could appoint the trust

518

Willms, supra note 17, at 37.
“Decanting” refers to the practice of transferring wine from its original bottle to another
receptacle in order to remove sediment and other impurities. See Niendorf, supra note 3, at
619.
520 Medlin, supra note 16, at 94-95.
521 Simmons, supra note 19, at 255 (identifying fifteen reasons to decant).
522 See William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and
Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 14-15
(2010-11).
523 142 Fla. 782, 196 So. 299 (1940).
524 Id. at 783, 196 So. at 300.
525 Id.
526 Id. at 784, 196, So. at 300.
527 Id. at 784, 196 So. at 300.
528 Phipps, at 784, 196 So. at 300.
519
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property in this manner, and the corporate trustee appealed.529
The Florida Supreme Court determined that John had a
special, not a general, power of appointment since he could only
distribute the trust property to Margarita’s descendants.530 The
corporate trustee argued that when the power to appoint was special,
the trustee could only appoint in further trust if the trust instrument
expressly authorized him to do so.531 However, the court found that
Margarita “reposed unlimited confidence and discretion” in her
husband, and “clothed him with absolute power to administer and
dispose of the trust estate to any one of the named beneficiaries to the
exclusion of the others.”532 Therefore, the court concluded that the
trust instrument vested John with the power to create a second trust
as long as one or more of Margarita’s descendants were made trust
beneficiaries.533
In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, an Iowa
court relied on a special power of appointment analysis to uphold a
trustee’s power to appoint trust property to another trust.534 Unlike
the Phipps court, the court in Spencer did not require any affirmative
grant of authority in the trust instrument to appoint in further trust;
instead, it recognized an implied power to appoint as long as the
settlor did not “manifest a contrary intent.”535
A New Jersey appeals court also upheld a trustee’s
distribution of trust property to a new trust in Wiedenmayer v.
Johnson.536 In 1944, John Seward Johnson established an inter vivos
trust for his son, John Seward Johnson, Jr.537 The trust instrument
authorized the trustees to pay John, Jr. “so much of the net income in
any year as the trustees in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion
may deem to be for his best interests.”538 In addition, “whenever in
their absolute and uncontrolled discretion [the trustees] deem it to be
for his best interests” they were also permitted to pay over to John,
Jr. “any or all of the Trust Property.”539 When the trustees agreed to
distribute the trust corpus to John, Jr. in a new trust, several of his

529

Id. at 784-85, 196 So. at 300-01.
Id. at at 786, 196 So. at 301.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 786, 196 So. at 301.
533 Phipps, at 786, 196 So. at 301.
534 232 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1975).
535 Id. at 496.
536 106 N.J. Super. 161, 163, 254 A.2d 534, 535 (App. Div. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 55 N.J.
81, 259 A.2d 465 (1969).
537 Id. at 164, 254 A.2d at 535.
538 Id.
539 Id.
530
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minor children, through their guardians ad litem, objected because
the new trust failed to preserve their contingent remainders under
the original trust.540
On appeal, the court observed that the trustees’ power to
distribute trust property to John, Jr. was limited only by the required
determination the distribution would be in his “best interests.”541 In
the court’s view, “the trustees could, to safeguard the son’s best
interests, condition the distribution upon his setting up a substituted
trust.”542 Finally, the court dismissed the claims of John, Jr.’s
children, reasoning that the trustees did not deprive them of any
rights since their contingent interests would extinguish if the trustees
exercised their right to distribute the trust property absolutely to
John, Jr.543 Note that the court in Johnson, unlike those in Phipps
and Spencer, did not condition the power of a trustee to appoint in
further trust on the existence of a special power of appointment;
instead, it concluded that this power was based on the trustee’s
exercise of a discretionary power to distribute the trust property to a
beneficiary.544
Finally, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently
endorsed the concept of decanting by name in Morse v. Kraft.545 In
1982, Robert and Myra Kraft established a trust and four sub-trusts
for their four sons (the “1982 Trusts”).546
However, the trust
instrument provided that only a “disinterested trustee” could make
distributions from the sub-trusts to the children.547 Richard Morse,
the sole trustee, proposed to transfer all of the property in the subtrusts to new sub-trusts established in accordance with the terms of a
new master trust (the 2012 Trust).548 This transfer, if permitted,
would have enabled the sons to serve as trustees with distributive
powers over their respective sub-trusts.549
The trustee was concerned that the terms of the 2012 Trust
would trigger liability under the GST tax.550 This, in turn, depended
upon whether the 1982 Trust authorized distributions to the 2012
Trust by the trustee “without the consent or approval of any

540
541
542
543
544
545
546
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548
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Id. at 165, 254 A.2d at 536.
Wiedenmayer, at 164, 254 A.2d at 535-36.
Id. at 165, 254 A.2d at 536.
Id. at 165-66, 254 A.2d at 536.
See Culp & Mellen, supra note 522, at 11.
Morse v. Kraft, 466 Mass. 92, 992 N.E.2d 1021 (2013).
Id. at 92, 992 N.E.2d at 1022-1023.
Id. at 93, 992 N.E.2d at 1023.
Id. at 94, 992 N.E.2d at 1023.
Id.
Morse, 466 Mass. at 94-95, 992 N.E.2d at 1023-24.
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beneficiary or court.”551 The court first observed that donees of a
nonfiduciary special power of appointment could appoint trust
property in further trust, provided that the donor did not express a
contrary intent.552 Examining the language of the 1982 Trust, the
court determined that it did not expressly authorize the trustee to
make distributions in further trust.553 On the other hand, the trustee
was vested with broad discretion insofar as distributions were
concerned.554 Therefore, the court concluded that there was nothing
to preclude the trustee from exercising the power to decant from the
1982 Trust to the 2012 Trust.555
2. The Statutory Power to Decant
In 1992, New York became the first state to enact a statute
that authorized trustees to decant from one trust to another.556 Since
then, a number of other states have passed legislation to authorize
decanting.557 Although these statutes are not uniform,558 they do
address a number of common issues.559 For example, state decanting
statutes impose different requirements for authorizing trustees to
decant. In some states, a trustee cannot decant unless he has the
power to invade the principal to make distributions.560 Statutes in
other states permit decanting only if the trustee has the “absolute
power” to invade the principal,561 while statutes in a third group of
states allow decanting if the trustee has absolute or more limited

551

Id. at 95, 992 N.E.2d at 1024 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(1)(i) (2012)).
Id. at 96, 992 N.E.2d at 1025 (citing Loring v. Karri-Davies, 371 Mass. 346, 357 N.E.2d
11 (1976)).
553 Id. at 97, 992 N.E.2d at 1025.
554 Id. at 98-99, 992 N.E.2d at 1026-27.
555 Morse, at 98-99, 992 N.E.2d at 1026-27.
556 See Culp & Mellen, supra note 522, at 3.
557 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819 (2011); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528 (2015); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4 (West 2014); IND. CODE §
30-4-3-36 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
556.115a (2014), 700.7103 (2014), 700.7820a (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419 (West
2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556 (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418 (2014); N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1
(2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31 (2014); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-2-15 to 55-2-21 (2014); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-15-816 (West 2014); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 112.071-.089 (West 2013);
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1 (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-816 (West 2014). It should
be noted that the Uniform Trust Code does not specifically authorize decanting. See
Simmons, supra note 19, at 263.
558 See Niendorf, supra note 3, at 624.
559 See generally, William R. Burford, State Decanting Statutes: Tax and Non-Tax Aspects
of Decanting Irrevocable Trusts, TSUB09-ALI-CLE 35, 37-44 (Sept. 27, 2012).
560 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 3528; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816.
561 See IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31.
552
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power to invade the principal.562 Other statutes permit a trustee to
decant if he has the discretionary power to distribute principal or
income.563 Finally, a New Hampshire statute authorizes decanting if
the trustee has the discretionary power to make distributions.564
Although a trustee’s power to decant varies somewhat under these
statutes, the common denominator is that in order to decant, the
trustee must have some discretion to distribute trust income or
principal to an ascertainable class of beneficiaries.
Typically, state decanting statutes also place certain
restrictions on a trustee’s power to decant. For example, a number of
statutes provide that a trustee can only create a new trust in favor of
one or more beneficiaries of the original trust.565 However, in a
number of states, the second trust can vest a beneficiary with a power
of appointment whose natural objects were not potential appointees
under the original trust.566 In addition, statutes in a variety of states
indicate that by decanting, the trustee can extend the time that the
property will be held in trust, but not beyond the perpetuities period
applicable to the original trust.567
Decanting statutes in certain states prohibit the trustee from
reducing a beneficiary’s fixed income interest under the original trust
by decanting trust property to a new trust,568 while others prohibit
accelerating remainder interests to current beneficial interests as a
result of decanting.569 In addition, statutes in some states prohibit or
562

See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18.
563 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419; NEV. REV. STAT. §
163.556; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15; VA. CODE ANN. §
64.2-778.1.
564 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418 (2014).
565 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419; NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN. STAT. §
36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 55-2-15 to 55-2-21; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.
566 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; NEV. REV. STAT. §
163.556; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.
567 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/16.4; IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS Law § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-20; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.
568 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 3528; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
386.175; MO. ANN. Stat. § 456.4-419; NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
564-B:4-418; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 55-2-15 to 55-2-21; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.
569 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.
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restrict the right to decant property when a beneficiary possesses a
presently exercisable withdrawal power.570
A large number of states require that a trustee must give
written notice to the beneficiaries of the original trust before
exercising the power to decant.571 In Nevada, the trustee must either
notify the trust beneficiaries or seek court approval before
decanting.572 However, in New Hampshire, the trustee need only
provide notice to those beneficiaries who are charitable entities.573
Finally, statutes in many states permit a trustee to decant without
first seeking court approval.574
3. Fiduciary Duties and Tax Issues
Although decanting is a useful way to modify the terms of a
trust, trustees need to proceed with caution. First of all, a trustee
acts in a fiduciary capacity when exercising the power to decant.575 A
number of statutes state that a trustee owes a fiduciary duty to
beneficiaries of the trust when decanting.576 The South Dakota
statute specifies that a trustee must determine whether appointing in
further trust is “necessary and desirable” after taking account of (1)
the purposes of the original trust, (2) “the terms and conditions of the
second trust, and (3) the consequences of the distribution.”577 On the
other hand, an Ohio statute provides that “a trustee who acts
reasonably and in good faith . . . is presumed to have acted in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests
of the beneficiaries.”578 Moreover, it is not clear whether a trustee can
be held liable for failing to decant. Several states have declared that
a trustee’s decision whether to decant is a matter of discretion,579
while Missouri’s decanting statute explicitly states that a trustee’s
570

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418. This
restriction is probably designed to avoid gift tax liability when certain parties are involved,
or certain types of property are transferred, when decanting occurs. See Culp & Mellen,
supra note 522, at 3.
571 See IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419;
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5808.18; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-18; VA. CODE ANN. §
64.2-778.1.
572 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556.
573 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418.
574 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 3528; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.
575 See Culp & Mellen, supra note 522, at 48.
576 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
564-B:4-418; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.
577 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15.
578 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18.
579 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-816(b).
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fiduciary obligations do not impose an affirmative duty to decant.580
Finally, exercising a power of appointment to transfer
property from one trust to another may result in increased tax
liability if not done properly.581 For example, decanting by a trustee
who is also a beneficiary may result in gift tax liability, unless
distributions are limited by an ascertainable standard.582 In addition,
decanting from a trust that is exempt from the GST tax may result in
loss of exempt status if not done properly.583
C. Modification and Termination by a Trust Protector
A trust protector is a person, other than the settlor or a
trustee, who is authorized to exercise one or more powers over the
trust.584 Trust protectors can be traced back to a number of sources,
including non-trustee functionaries associated with England and
various Commonwealth countries, officers associated with offshore
and domestic asset protection trusts, and trust advisors in America
with supervisory powers over a trustee’s investment decisions.585 A
majority of jurisdictions in the United States now recognize the legal
status of trust protectors either through the adoption of the Uniform
Trust Code586 or the enactment of statutes expressly authorizing their
use by settlors.587
Arguably, a settlor can vest a trust protector with the power to
modify or terminate the trust.588 The Uniform Trust Code states that
the trust instrument may confer upon a trustee or “other person,”
such as a trust protector, the power to direct the modification or
termination of a trust. Some state statutes, such as Alaska,589
Arizona,590 Idaho,591 Missouri,592 South Dakota,593 and Wyoming594
580

MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419.
See Culp & Mellen, supra note 522, at 16-37; Willms, supra note 17, at 67-80; Diana
S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax Effects of Decanting — Obtaining and
Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. TAX’N 288, 291 (2009).
582 Treas. Reg, § 25.2511-1(g)(1-2) (1960).
583 See generally Willms, supra note 17, at 77-78.
584 See MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.8-808 (West 2014).
585 See Ausness, supra note 268, at 278-81.
586 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b) cmt. (declaring that “[s]ections (b)-(d) ratify the use of trust
protectors and trust advisors”).
587 For citations to these statutes, along with useful comments, see Gideon Rothchild, Trust
Protectors: What Role Do They Play? Estate Planning in Depth 585, 597 (SS043 ALI-ABA
(June 12-17, 2011)).
588 See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trusty Watchdog or Expensive Exotic
Pet? 30 EST. PLAN. 390, 391 (2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and
Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2779 (2005-06).
589 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(b)(1-4).
590 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818(b)(1-5).
591 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(6).
581
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list the power to modify or terminate a trust (at least in some
circumstances) as one of the powers that a trust protector may
exercise when authorized by the trust instrument. Other statutes are
less explicit, but appear to permit a trust protector to exercise any
power expressly mentioned in the trust instrument.595 This would
seem to include the power to modify or terminate the trust.
However, there is the question of whether a trust protector is
subject to any fiduciary duties. There is some authority to the effect
that trust advisors in America cannot exercise their powers for their
own personal benefit.596 There are similar holdings from foreign
jurisdictions involving trust protectors.597 In addition, the Uniform
Trust Code declares that power holders (such as trust protectors) are
presumed to be fiduciaries, at least when exercising the power to
direct the trustee to do something.598 A number of state statutes also
impose fiduciary duties on trust protectors.599
However, other
statutes state that a trust protector shall not be considered a fiduciary
unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.600 The only appellate
case to consider whether a trust protector was a fiduciary was Robert
T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Davis, which eventually dismissed the
trust beneficiary’s claims against the trust protector.601 The court
concluded that the trust had not suffered any loss as the result of the
trust protector’s failure to remove a prior trustee.602 Although the
court indicated that the trust protector owed a fiduciary duty to the
beneficiary, its observation was merely dictum since it ultimately
decided the case on causation grounds.603
Arguably, a trust protector who exercises a discretionary
power to modify or terminate a trust should be held to the same
fiduciary standard as a trustee who is exercising the same power.

592

MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.8-808.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6.
594 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710.
595 See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A Question of Fiduciary Power.
Should a Trust Protector Be Held to a Fiduciary Standard? 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 68 (201011).
596 See Stuart v. Wilmington Trust Co., 474 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. 1984).
597 See Ausness, supra note 268, at 288-92.
598 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d).
599 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202 (2014); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(e)
(2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7809 (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711 (West
2014).
600 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-1.1 (2014).
601 283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d on remand sub nom. Robert T. McLean
Irrevocable Trust v. Ponder, 418 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
602 Ponder, at 498.
603 Id. at 487, 490, 494, 496.
593

AUSNESS.MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

294

QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL

4/20/15 3:19 PM

[Vol. 28

That standard, as articulated in Hammerstein,604 is that a court will
not overrule a trustee’s discretion unless the trustee “wilfully abuses
his discretion or acts arbitrarily, fraudulently, dishonestly, or with an
improper motive.”605 Of course, this is only a default standard;
presumably, the settlor can subject the trust protector to a higher
fiduciary standard in the trust instrument.
D. Summary
Settlors who wish to avoid the delays and expense of judicial
modification or termination of their trusts can authorize a trustee or
trust protector to exercise this power instead. Trust instruments
have empowered trustees to terminate trusts for many years606 and
the Uniform Trust Code also endorses this practice.607 Case law608
and the Uniform Trust Code609 also permit trustees to modify trust
terms if they are authorized to do so by trust instrument. In addition,
a number of courts and state statutes have recognized the validity of
decanting, a practice by which a trustee or other power holder is
allowed to appoint trust property to another trust.610 Finally, the
settlor may empower a trust protector instead of the trustee to modify
or terminate a trust.611
V. THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE DEAD HAND CONTROL
Settlors often use trusts to maintain some control over their
property after death. For example, vesting of property interests may
be postponed until a beneficiary reaches a certain age; spendthrift
provisions can restrict alienation; and incentive provisions can
encourage particular behavior. However, beneficiaries often consider
these sorts of restrictions or conditions to be inconvenient or
unreasonable, especially after the settlor is dead.
For them,
modification or termination is a means to escape the dead hand’s
oppressive grasp.
A. The Conflict Between Deceased Settlors and Living
Beneficiaries
If the interests of the deceased settlor and the living trust
beneficiaries sometimes diverge, then what is the proper balance to
604

631 S.W.2d 858.
Id. at 863.
606 See, e.g., McManus’ Estate, at 184, 62 A.D.2d at 764; Eckert’s Trust, at 35-36, 258
N.Y.S.2d at 543; Fishberg, at 3, 285 N.Y.S. at 307; Major, at 102 163 N.Y.S. at 925.
607 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c).
608 See Rosner, 105 Misc. 2d 592, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 577.
609 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) .
610 Medlin, supra note 16, at 94.
611 See Ruce, supra note 594, at 68.
605
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strike between them? There appear to be at least three general
approaches for further consideration.
The first alternative,
612
exemplified by Saunders, would permit a court to terminate a trust
at any time with the consent of all of its beneficiaries.613 This rule,
which is followed in England, treats the interests of the beneficiaries
as completely superior to those of the settlor, and allows them to
“overbear and defeat the intention of a testator or settlor”614 whenever
they choose. At the other extreme, the traditional American rules on
modification and termination treat the interests of the settlor as
paramount and refuse to allow modification or termination if one or
more of the trust’s material purposes remains to be accomplished.615
The approaches taken by the Uniform Trust Code and the Third
Restatement, which relax the Claflin doctrine’s material purpose
requirement somewhat,616 can be said to occupy a middle ground
between these two approaches.
Of course, this debate is part of a larger controversy about
testamentary dispositions of property in general. Opponents of dead
hand control argue that it is undesirable because of imperfect
information on the part of the deceased donor, the possibility of
negative externalities, and concerns about intergenerational equity.617
According to one school of thought, imperfect information, particularly
about future events and circumstances, may cause donors to make
dispositions of their property that they would not have made had they
been better prognosticators.618 Unfortunately, once the donor is dead,
such decisions cannot be reversed.619 Particular dispositions may also
result in negative externalities by imposing social costs on others.620
For example, society may have to support a donor’s dependent
children when he fails to provide for them after death.621 Another
concern is the problem of first-generation monopoly.622 As Stephen
Shavell observes, “[b]y virtue of its priority in time, the present
generation owns the whole earth and all the things on it.”623
Consequently, if this generation is allowed to tie up existing property
well into the future, subsequent generations will have less property of
612

(1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch).
See Sitkoff, supra note 58, at 663.
614 Goulding v. James, [1997] 2 All E.R. 239 (A.C.) at 247.
615 See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 468.
616 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1329.
617 Kelly, supra note 48, at 1158.
618 See Stephen Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 70 (2004).
619 See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 699 (8th ed. 2011).
620 Kelly, supra note 48, at 1161.
621 See Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand
Alone? 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996-97).
622 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1321.
623 Shavell, supra note 617, at 71.
613
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their own to invest and dispose of as they see fit.624
Proponents of dead hand control have compelling arguments of
their own.625 First, permitting some degree of dead hand control
provides donors with the satisfaction of knowing that they have
provided financial security to loved ones, and possibly protected them
from the vicissitudes of life and the consequences of poor judgment.626
In addition, a donor is likely to work harder to accumulate property if
he knows that he can exercise some control over its disposition and
use after death.627
Furthermore, donors will probably possess
accurate information about the circumstances of prospective donees
and, when necessary, can include protective devices, such as support
and spendthrift provisions in their donative instruments.628 Finally,
allowing dead hand control may enable parents to exercise a benign
influence over the conduct of their children after death.629
B. Perpetual or “Dynasty” Trusts
Allowing property owners to control the use of their property
after death also gives rise to the question of how long dead hand
control should be permitted to last. Most trust instruments direct the
trustee to pay income to a certain class of individuals, usually the
children of the settlor. At the death of the income beneficiaries, the
trust corpus is then distributed free of trust to a second class of
beneficiaries, usually the settlor’s grandchildren. Thus, the settlor
exercises control over his property for only one generation.630 One
reason that trusts seldom last for more than one or two generations is
the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Rule in its traditional form
requires that interests not fully vested either become vested or fail to
vest within the lifetime of a living person plus an additional twentyone years.631 Contingents who may exceed that period are considered
invalid ab initio.632 The use of a “life or lives in being” as a means of
determining the validity of an interest was based on the notion that

624

See Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The “Wait and See”
Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 191 (1953-54).
625 See Kelly, supra note 48, at 1135-38.
626 Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, DEATH, TAXES, & FAMILY
PROPERTY 3, 5, (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed, West Publ’g Co. 1977).
627 See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1992-93); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand
Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1989-90).
628 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 626, at 12.
629 Kelly, supra note 48, at 1137.
630 However, in order to avoid the possibility of having to appoint guardians for underage
beneficiaries, settlors often provide that property will continue to be held in trust until
members of the second generation reach their majority.
631 See John Chipman Gray, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).
632 See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 600.
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the settlor could properly assess the capabilities of living persons, but
could know nothing about unborn persons.633
In recent years, however, a large number of states have
abolished or substantially modified the Rule Against Perpetuities,
thereby enabling a settlor to create multi-generational trusts. Many
commentators believe that a change in federal tax legislation is
responsible for this development.634 In 1986, Congress imposed a tax
on GSTs that enabled the first generation of beneficiaries, who had
equitable life estates, to avoid estate tax liability.635 The tax taxes
GSTs at a rate equivalent to the highest estate tax rate. However,
legislation included a $1 million exemption for each transferor, which
is now over $5 million per transferor.636 Furthermore, if a settlor
places exempted property into a trust, the property will not be subject
to GST tax liability until the trust terminates.637 When the GST tax
legislation was passed in 1986, only Idaho, Wisconsin, and South
Dakota had abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities. Therefore,
legislatures assumed that exempt trusts would terminate, and become
subject to tax liability, within a generation or two. Instead, over the
next three decades almost thirty states abolished or modified the Rule
Against Perpetuities, thereby allowing trusts to last beyond the period
allowed by the traditional Rule. Many wealthy persons, who liked the
idea of establishing a trust that would last for hundreds of years
without being subject to GST tax liability, set up trusts in states
which allowed such trusts to be created.638

633

See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1309. Courts later allowed the settlor to
exercise an additional twenty-one years of control to account for the possibility that some
beneficiaries might be minors. Id.
634 See, e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1315; Mary Louise Fellows, Why the
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511,
2513, 2518-20 (2005-06); Gallanis, supra note 51, at 232-33; Max M. Schanzenbach &
Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2467 (2005-06); Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 602-05.
635 A tax on generation-skipping transfers was first enacted in 1976. However, it was
substantially revised by Congress in the 1986 legislation. See Perpetual Trusts, supra note
200, at 602.
636 Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149,
1164 n.77 (2010-11) (citing I.R.C. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c) (2012))(reviewing Lawrence M.
Friedman, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW
(Stanford Univ. Press 2009)).
637 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1313.
638 Dukeminier and Krier provide an example of what a tax exempt perpetual trust might
look like. The settlor transfers $5 million (or whatever amount is current exempt from GST
tax liability) to a trust that will pay income to the settlor’s daughter for life. At the
daughter’s death, the trust will be divided into separate shares for each of the daughter’s
children. Each child receives an income interest in his or her share of the trust. Upon each
child’s death, his or her share of the trust will be further divided and held in trust for that
child’s issue per stirpes. This process of further dividing shares of the trust will continue for
as long as state law permits. If one line of the settlor’s descendants runs out, that share will
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However, trusts of such long duration present a number of
challenges to efficient trust administration.639 Lack of flexibility is an
obvious concern.640 A wise settlor can minimize this difficulty by
empowering the trustee or a trust protector to modify the trust in
response to changing circumstances. Otherwise, those who seek to
modify a perpetual trust will have to rely on equitable deviation.
Another problem is the proliferation of beneficiaries that will
inevitably occur over time.641 If each beneficiary’s interest is divided
among his heirs at his death, the number of beneficiaries will
substantially increase after several generations, making trust
administration increasingly difficult.642
Shortly before his death, Jesse Dukeminier and his co-author,
James Krier, proposed a number of statutory “default rules” to
address some of the problems associated with perpetual trusts.643
One alternative was to enact a statute that automatically terminated
a trust after a certain period of time.644 This would place an absolute
time limit on the duration of trusts and, unlike the traditional Rule
Against Perpetuities, would deal with the duration problem directly
instead of relying on lives in being and vesting to limit duration. A
second approach was to limit the power to modify or terminate a trust
for one generation, but freely allow it by later generations of
beneficiaries.645 This approach would involve the enactment of a
statute that allows a court to terminate or modify the trust, after all
of the income beneficiaries alive at the creation of the trust are dead,
in order to benefit the next generation of income beneficiaries.646
Presumably, a court will still have the power to terminate or modify a
trust while the first generation of beneficiaries are still alive, but it
would have to abide by the more restrictive requirements of the
Claflin Doctrine, the Uniform Trust Code, or the Third Restatement.

be divided among the remaining branches of the family. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E.
Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1315-18 (2003).
639
In addition, some commentators have pointed out, state prohibitions against
“perpetuities,” such as that found in the North Carolina constitution, raise questions about
the validity of Perpetual Trusts.
See Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1821-22 (2014).
640 Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1179 (2013-14).
641 See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 625.
642 Ascher, supra note 636, at 1161-62. Professor Ascher estimates that the average settlor
might have as many as 450 descendants 150 years after establishing a perpetual trust. Id.
at 1161.
643 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1340-41. As Professor Tate points out, these
proposed rules are mandatory, not permissive. See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 610.
644 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1340.
645 Id. at 1340-41.
646 Id. at 1341.
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Dukeminier and Krier’s third statutory proposal would vest
each second-generation income beneficiary with a special power to
appoint his share of trust property during life or by will to anyone
except himself, his creditors, or his estate.647 The donee of this power
could terminate the trust by appointing the entire trust corpus and
could effectively modify the trust by appointing the property in
further trust.648 A fourth statutory proposal would give the trustee
the power by statute to modify or terminate the trust.649
C. Limiting Unreasonable Dead Hand Control
Dukeminier and Krier have identified a number of problems
with perpetual trusts, including first-generation monopoly,
inflexibility, and unreasonable duration.650 The inflexibility problem
can easily be solved by allowing beneficiaries at some point to modify
the administrative and distributive terms of the trust with or without
court approval. The problem of unreasonable duration and attendant
dead hand control can be addressed by placing some sort of time limit
on the duration of private trusts. For example, states that have
abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities could reinstate it. Another
approach is to place a fixed time period, such as 100 years, on the
duration of any private trust. Finally, states may adopt some version
of the Dukeminier and Krier proposal and limit the temporal scope of
dead hand control to the first generation of beneficiaries.651 Limiting
the duration of a trust could also address the problem of firstgeneration monopoly.
Assuming that a trust can be terminated involuntarily, a
vexing question remains unanswered: to whom should the trust
property be distributed upon termination? Consider the following
three examples. First, assume that the settlor vests his children with
an income interest with a gift over to each income beneficiary’s
children per stirpes. How will the trust property be distributed?
There are a number of possibilities. If the settlor is barred from
deciding who gets his property after the deaths of the first-generation
647

Id.
Id. A variant on this third proposal would vest income beneficiaries with a power,
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to health, education, support or maintenance,
to withdraw principal for their own benefit. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1341.
649 Id.
650 See id. at 1321-28.
651 The term generation, as I am using it, does not necessarily mean a biological
generation, but rather it refers to successive classes of beneficiaries. Thus, the first group of
beneficiaries who receive a present interest in the trust would constitute the first
generation. While in most cases, this class of beneficiaries would be made up of children of
the settlor, it could be composed of children and grandchildren or some other biological
mixture. The first group of beneficiaries to take after the death of first-generation
beneficiaries (remaindermen) make up the second generation and so on.
648
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beneficiaries, then the gift over would be void and the trust property
would revert to the settlor’s estate. This result not only makes little
sense, but it may result in the trust corpus being included in the
settlor’s gross estate for estate tax purposes. A better alternative
would be to distribute the property free of trust to the heirs of the
income beneficiaries, not as remaindermen, but as beneficiaries under
the statute.652 Finally, the last and best approach would be to simply
honor the settlor’s wishes and uphold the validity of the remainder to
the settlor’s grandchildren.653 Likewise, if the settlor specified that at
the death of the last income beneficiary, the trust principal was to be
distributed to the grandchildren per capita instead of per stirpes, that
distributional formula should be honored as well.
But consider the example of a perpetual trust where there is
an infinite succession of income interests. What happens to the trust
property when the first-generation beneficiaries die? Unlike the first
example, the settlor in this case has not made a gift over free of trust.
Instead, if the terms of the trust were upheld, the next generation of
beneficiaries would only have an income interest. However, the
statute directs that at this point the trust property must be
distributed free of trust. Once again, there are several options. One
possibility is to vest each first-generation income beneficiary with a
special power of appointment to appoint a share of the trust property
by will to anyone except himself, his creditors, or his estate.654 The
amount of property subject to appointment is based on the number of
persons in the class of first-generation beneficiaries. Thus, if the firstgeneration income beneficiaries consisted of the settlor’s four children,
each child is allowed to appoint one-fourth of the trust corpus, with
the beneficiary’s heirs being designated as takers in default. Finally,
the approach that seems most consistent with the settlor’s intent is
converting the interest of second-generation beneficiaries from an
income interest to an absolute one. In other words, the intended
beneficiaries remain the same, but the nature of their interest is
changed. As in the previous example, the settlor is allowed to
determine who gets the trust property when the first-generation
beneficiaries die, but the distribution is made free of trust.
The third example involves discretionary trusts. In such
cases, the beneficiaries are not entitled to any fixed amount of income
or principal. Of course, it does not matter that first-generation
652

This might be roughly analogous to an anti-lapse statute that makes a substitute gift
when the original gift lapses. However, in this example, the gift to the remaindermen
lapses not because they are dead, but because the statute has deprived the settlor of the
power to make it.
653 Notice that the class of takers in the second option (heirs) is greater than the class of
takers in the third option.
654 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1341.
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beneficiaries had a mere expectancy, as long as the remainder
interest is not also subject to the trustee’s discretion. As in the first
example, the trust property can be distributed free of trust to the
remaindermen. However, the situation becomes more complicated
with certain types of perpetual trusts where distributions to
successive generations of beneficiaries are also subject to the trustee’s
discretion. In such cases, the best approach is to distribute the trust
property pro rata and free of trust to second-generation beneficiaries
provided for in the trust instrument.
Hand

D. A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Dead

Balancing the interests of dead settlors and living
beneficiaries is a task that would challenge even the great Sherlock
Holmes. Unfortunately, since he is not available, I will have to tackle
this problem on my own. However, before doing so, I would like to
start with a few basic assumptions. First, the interests of both
settlors and beneficiaries are legitimate and are entitled to some
recognition. Therefore, whatever rule emerges must balance the
interests of both parties. Second, there is a need to limit the duration
of dead hand control. Accordingly, at some point in time effective
control over the trust property must pass from the settlor to the
beneficiaries and the best way to accomplish this is to allow
beneficiaries at some point to terminate the trust if they wish to do so.
With that in mind, I propose the enactment of a statute that
would limit the power to modify or terminate a trust for one
generation, but freely allow it by later generations of beneficiaries
who have reached their majority.
This approach is based on
Dukeminier and Krier’s first proposal, and recognizes the settlor’s
right to control the trust property during the lives of persons who are
personally known to him, but not otherwise.655 The statute would
read as follows:
If an irrevocable or testamentary trust does not provide for the
distribution of the trust principal outright and free of trust at the
death of the last member of the first generation of beneficiaries
eligible to receive income or principal from the trust, each adult
member of the succeeding class of beneficiaries shall have the power
to direct the trustee to distribute his or her share of the trust
principal outright and free of trust at any time and without court
approval.
In addition, those members of the succeeding class of
beneficiaries who do not choose to terminate their interest in the trust
655

Id. at 1340.

AUSNESS.MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

302

QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL

4/20/15 3:19 PM

[Vol. 28

may direct the trustee to place their share of the trust principal in a
separate sub-trust that is subject to different terms and conditions.
The right to modify or terminate their interest in a trust shall apply
to all subsequent beneficiaries as long as the trust remains in
existence.
When a trust beneficiary exercises the right to receive his or
her interest in the trust principal outright or to direct its transfer to a
separate trust, in the absence of a method or formula for calculating
the beneficiary’s share in the will or trust instrument itself, the
beneficiary’s share shall be based on the law of intestacy if the
beneficiary is related to the prior generation’s class of beneficiaries. If
not, the beneficiary’s share shall consist of a pro rata amount based
on the number of beneficiaries in the class of which the beneficiary is
a member.
Implicit in the foregoing statutory proposal is the assumption
that the first-generation beneficiaries are still able to seek judicial
modification or termination of the trust, but they have to satisfy
whatever requirements are applicable to modification or termination.
In addition, the statute does not force the beneficiaries to terminate
the trust when the last of the first-generation beneficiaries dies;
rather, they are free, individually or collectively, to modify the
administrative or distributive terms of the trust if they choose.
Finally, the right to terminate or modify the trust is individual, not
collective. Each second-generation (or later) beneficiary can take his
share out of the trust at any time or transfer it to a sub-trust with
different terms and conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is sometimes desirable to modify or even terminate
irrevocable trusts. This is particularly true of perpetual trusts that
can potentially last for centuries. In the past, it was difficult for
beneficiaries to modify or prematurely terminate irrevocable trusts
because courts felt constrained to carry out the deceased settlor’s
intent as embodied in the trust instrument. This led to a number of
problems, including the lack of flexibility. Unless the settlor was
prescient enough to give the trustee or trust protector the power to
modify or terminate the trust, unforeseen circumstances could defeat
the settlor’s estate plan or interfere with efficient administration of
the trust. Traditional restrictions on modification and termination
also enabled dead hand control to last for an unreasonable length of
time. The Uniform Trust Code and the Third Restatement liberalized
the rules on modification and termination somewhat, but arguably did
not go far enough. Inspired by the work of Dukeminier and Krier, I
have developed a statutory proposal that would allow deceased
settlors to maintain control over trust property during the lives of the
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first generation of beneficiaries, but would allow subsequent
generations of beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust without
judicial approval.

